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The current research draws from the self-determination theory (SDT) and explores the possible 
effects of choice and autonomy on moral attitudes. Specifically, SDT predicted that choice and 
autonomy would lead to a greater intrinsic motivation to assert beliefs, and consequently, a 
greater attitudinal deviation from the norm. On the other hand, individuals who experience a lack 
of choice and lower levels of autonomy, would be less willing to assert beliefs due to a lower 
intrinsic motivation, thus leading to lower levels of attitudinal deviation. I sought to examine the 
veracity of these predictions across several studies.  
The first chapter reviews different conceptualizations of freedom, and concluded that freedom 
means choice and autonomy, while the second chapter reviews concepts of morality. Study 1 did 
not produce any detectable effects when utilizing a common choice-no-choice paradigm used by 
many researchers. It was suspected that the null findings were either due to a suppression effect 
of social desirability or a failure to manipulate actual levels of autonomy. Study 2 therefore 
directly manipulated levels of autonomy instead of indirectly through choice. Evidence suggests 
that control motivated participants exhibited lower levels of attitudinal deviation, indicating 
some support for the self-determination theory. However, results were again inconclusive. Study 
3 then attempted to bypass social desirability by using implicit measures of attitudes, which 
resulted in some evidence that choice led to a greater attitudinal deviation. Study 4 used data 
from the World Values Survey, which spanned across 87 societies from 1981 – 2009. However, 
results indicated a significant relationship between perceived freedom and attitude deviation. 
Taken together, there was conflicting evidence that the self-determination theory perspective is 
at work when choice and autonomy interacts with moral attitudes, and would require further 





A Brief Overview of Freedom 
“No idea is so generally recognized as indefinite, ambiguous, and open to the greatest 
misconceptions… as the idea of Freedom: none in the common currency with so little 
appreciation of its meaning.” (Hegel, 1817/1971, pp.239) 
The Clarion Call of Freedom 
 From the Civil Rights Movement led by Martin Luther King, to the recent Arab Spring 
Movement, freedom has been repeatedly used in history as an effective clarion call to rally the 
masses to collective action. At the same time, freedom or liberty has been enshrined as one of the 
fundamental values of many modern nation states (e.g., the United States Constitution). Hence, 
there seems to be a fundamental need or longing in human beings to be “free”, and this is 
potentially a strong motivating force.  
  While many have attempted to define what freedom is, as pointed out by Hegel 
(1817/1971), it remains as a concept that is relatively familiar, yet elusive to define well. A 
famous conceptualization of freedom stems from the eminent political thinker Isaiah Berlin. 
Berlin (1969) asserted that there were two types of freedom, namely positive freedom and 
negative freedom. Positive freedom is characterized as the “exposure to conditions necessary to 
pursue desired opportunities” (Ackerson & Subramanian, 2010, p. 2163), while negative 
freedom describes the state when a person is “not prevented, by human act or omission, from 
doing what he or she may wish to do” (Crowder, 2004, p. 66). Simply put, the distinction 
between the two types of freedoms centers around the ideas of removing obstacles or restraints to 
an individual (negative freedom or freedom “from”), and giving the individual opportunities and 





This conceptualization of freedom has received widespread usage in other disciplines (e.g., 
economics, political science, public health). However, how has the field of psychology dealt with 
this concept? 
Psychological perspectives: Reactance Theory and Self-Determination Theory 
 In social psychology, the concept of freedom is usually examined in the context of the 
individual’s personal choice and control (Jonas et al., 2009). Drawing from the common 
philosophical strand that freedom is somehow entwined with the concepts of the human will and 
autonomy (e.g., Mill, 1859/2002; Nietzsche, 1892/2005; Sartre, 1965; see Alford, 2005 for a 
discussion on the philosophical approaches to freedom), there exist two conceptualizations to 
freedom in the field of psychology that we would briefly review. The first is the reactance theory 
by Brehm (1966), and the second is the self-determination theory (SDT) by Deci and Ryan 
(1985). 
Reactance Theory 
Reactance theory, first proposed by Brehm (1966), focuses on specific individual 
freedoms and defines the boundary conditions that would provoke people to react when these 
freedoms are being threatened. Specifically, reactance theory posits that when a person believes 
that he or she is has the freedom to engage in a particular behavior, the person would experience 
psychological reactance when that freedom is being threatened or removed. Psychological 
reactance here is defined as the motivation state directed towards the restoration of the threatened 
or removed freedoms, and is manifested by an increased desire or attempts to engage in the 





It is important to note that reactance theory does not propose that individuals will seek 
freedom in every situation and context. Rather, individuals perceive that they have some specific 
freedoms, and will seek to reassert these under two conditions: (1) they believe that these 
freedoms actually exist, (2) they have the ability to exercise these freedoms. Therefore, reactance 
theory defines freedom as a “person’s belief to be able to engage in specific behaviors and to 
decide on the type of behavior, as well as how it is performed and when” (Jonas et al., 2009, p. 
1068). In short, according to reactance theory, perceived personal behavioral choice is freedom.   
Reactance theory has been studied extensively in social psychology (see Miron & Brehm, 
2006 for a review), and has yielded extensive and impressive results. Research has shown that a 
removal of free choice is a predictor of behaviors in many diverse domains such as consumption 
(Clee & Wicklund, 1980), health (Orbell & Hagger, 2006), and prosocial behavior (Krishnan & 
Carment, 1979). For example, in the domain of consumer behavior, a study by Wicklund, 
Slattum and Solomon (1970) recruited female participants to try on six pairs of sunglasses for a 
photo-shoot, and were asked to rate each pair of sunglasses. Furthermore, they were given the 
option to purchase the sunglasses if they liked them. Prior to the examination of the sunglasses, 
the experimenter either remarked that she hoped the participant would purchase a pair of 
sunglasses for a commission, or made no remarks. In addition, as the participants tried and rated 
each pair of sunglasses, the experimenter would give compliments to the participant (e.g., “These 
look great on you!”). Hence, the compliments and mention of a possible commission threatened 
the participant’s freedom not to purchase a pair of sunglasses. In line with the reactance theory, 
the commission condition produced lower ratings of the sunglasses as compared to the non-





can possibly be primed without conscious awareness (e.g., Chartrand, Dalton, & Fritzsimons, 
2007, Levav & Zhu, 2009, Wellman & Geers, 2009).  
Self-determination Theory 
Reactance theory’s emphasis on personal choice as freedom has significant overlaps with 
another conceptualization of freedom in social psychology, which is the self-determination 
theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985, Deci & Ryan, 2000). Self-determination theory posits the 
existence of innate basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness that 
guide human motivation and behavior. Competence refers to the desire to have control over 
outcomes and experience mastery (White, 1959), while relatedness refers to the want to remain 
in interactive connection with others and to care for others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The 
construct of interest here is autonomy, which refers to the volition, or the desire to direct one’s 
experiences and behaviors so that it is accordance with one’s identity (Angyal, 1965; deCharms, 
1968; Deci, 1980; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). SDT posits that sufficient 
satisfaction of these basic psychological needs will subsequently result in greater well-being for 
the individual (Ryan & Deci, 2001). 
Contrary to some discussions, autonomy does not refer to internal locus of control, 
independence, or individualism, but rather is concerned with the experience of integration and 
freedom (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Therefore, according to SDT, having freedom is having personal 
autonomy which is being able to choose to act accordingly to one’s identity. SDT in general, and 
personal autonomy in particular, have been the target of much empirical investigation. 
Autonomy has been shown to be a crucial predictor of personal well-being (see Chirkov, Ryan, 





domains such as dyadic, familial and parenting relationships (Knee & Ursal, 2011), schools and 
learning institutions (Reeve & Assor, 2011), physical wellness and healthcare (Williams, 
Teixeira, Carraça, & Resnicow, 2011), and the workplace (Gagné & Bhave, 2011). 
Evaluating the conceptualizations of freedom 
 Comparing the different conceptualizations, Berlin’s (1969) ideas of freedom seem to 
describe freedom at the institutional or systemic level, or rather, a more formal type of freedom. 
However, some scholars have argued that the current dominant conceptualization of freedom has 
moved away from systemic freedom and come to mean only freedom of choice (Markus & 
Schwartz, 2010). Similarly, in both Brehm’s (1966) and Deci and Ryan’s (2000) 
conceptualizations of freedom, the individual’s freedom to choose is central. Hence, it can be 
preliminarily concluded that freedom is equated to choice and autonomy. 
While it seems that freedom means choice and autonomy, the question remains whether 
people conceive freedom in a unanimous manner. In order to investigate if scholarly 
conceptualizations of freedom coincide with what people actually think, Alford (2005) 
conducted extended in-depth interviews, averaging an hour each, with 52 people, of whom 35 
were younger (18-30 years) and 17 were older (31-74 years) informants, asking them “What is 
freedom?” among other questions. Responses from the younger informants tended to center 
around the idea that freedom is freedom of choice. Alford (2005) also observed that as compared 
to the older informants, the younger informants tended to have an extremist view of freedom: 
they perceive that they either have it or they do not.  
In summary, there is some consensus that the idea of freedom in psychology relates to 






A Brief Overview of Morality 
 The issue of morality has intrigued and bedevilled scholars for centuries. From ancient 
philosophers like Aristotle’s (2000) Nicomachean Ethics, to Lao Tze’s (2007) Tao Te Ching, to 
the Enlightenment’s Hume (1777/1960) and Kant (1764/1960), and to modern day moral 
philosophers like MacIntyre (1984), all of them have struggled with the issue of morality. Other 
scholars from various disciplines have also joined the fray, which includes sociologists (Smith, 
2003), primatologists (de Waal, 1996), evolutionary biologists (Hauser, 2006; Huebner, Dwyer, 
& Hauser, 2009), neuroscientists (Greene, 2008; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), and of course, psychologists (Gilligan, 1982; Haidt, 2001; 
Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983) among many others. With such a multi-faceted, yet crucial 
construct like morality, it is little wonder that such a wide variety of disciplines have congregated 
and attempted to understand and explain it. 
 With so much attention on the issue of morality, what does social psychology has to say 
about it? Surprisingly little. Jonathan Haidt and Selin Kesebir (2010) did a brief survey on five of 
the current top textbooks on social psychology (ref. Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2007; 
Baumeister & Bushman, 2008; Gilovich, Keltner, & Nisbett, 2006; Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 
2008; Myers, 2008) and found that the words “morality” and “moral” referred to an average of 
6.8 pages combined. However, topics related to morality like altruism, prosocial behavior, 
aggression, obedience, norms, and stereotypes, have long been studied in the discipline. What 
this seems to suggest is that morality has often been reduced to its various components (i.e., 





multitude of moral beliefs, judgments and actions that are neither particularly altruistic nor 
aggressive (Smith, 2003), which implies that morality as a “whole” may be indeed much more 
than the sum of its “parts”. More specifically, morality as a whole may be much more than what 
social psychology has been investigating. 
 Since morality cannot be simply decomposed into its different facets, what exactly is 
morality? How should we define it, or how should we approach the topic? Following E. O. 
Wilson’s (1998) idea of consilience, Haidt (2007) argues that we need to draw and synthesize 
findings and insights from a wide variety of different disciplines in order to have a better 
understanding of what morality is. So how has the concept of morality been defined in human 
history? 
A short history of morality: Kinship selection and reciprocal altruism 
 Since morality is a defining feature for human beings (de Waal, 1996), tracing the origins 
and genesis of human societies may give us an idea of what morality is about, and what possible 
functions it has. Based on archaeological and linguistic evidence accrued, Diamond (2005) 
argued that early humans mainly engaged in nomadic hunter-gatherer lifestyle, and organized 
themselves in simple egalitarian bands or tribes that were tied together by kinship or kin-based 
clans. The number of people in early societies like this ranged from dozens to hundreds, and 
allowed for each individual to recognize and know other members in the same group. Morality, 
in societies like this, can then be explained by kinship selection and reciprocal altruism.  
 Kinship selection postulates that morality came about as a way to help the survival and 
propagation of genes that are similar to the individual’s. Therefore, I risk and sacrifice my life to 





propagated. This kind of behavior would then be selected, as this is adaptive for the survival of 
certain genes in the long run, though not necessary adaptive for the individual per se (Dawkins, 
2006). On the other hand, reciprocal altruism refers to the process that an individual would do 
“good” to another individual, so that one might in turn be the recipient of the prosocial behavior 
subsequently. In other words, I act in a prosocial way as a form of investment, since this may pay 
off later in time, when the initial recipient of my goodwill returns the favour. In turn, this would 
help ensure the survival and propagation of my genes to posterity. In this case, morality is simply 
a result of a trade between two actors.  
 Both of these explanations, which are popular in evolutionary biology, run into problems 
when human societies grow and evolve into much larger conglomerations. With the advent of 
agriculture, human societies became sedentary, and were able to support much high population 
densities (Diamond, 2005). This resulted in societies that were not simply bonded together by kin 
or kin-based clans. The chances of an individual now meeting an unfamiliar non-kin became 
drastically higher in high-density societies like this. The explanatory power of kinship selection 
drops significantly when non-kin engage in altruistic behavior towards each other. Why would 
complete strangers who are non-kin act in pro-social ways towards each other since the act itself 
does not necessarily increase the chances of propagating any genes that each individual has? 
Even more puzzling is if kinship selection is an adequate explanation for morality, then why 
would a phenomenon like a man jumping into a river to save someone else’s child ever occur?1  
 Reciprocal altruism can possibly give an explanation to the above conundrum by arguing 
that a man saving another man’s child would help the survival of his own children subsequently, 
when the man whose child was saved returns the favour. Again, this assumes that firstly, the man 





be in a position and proximity to return the favour subsequently. The problem arises when a 
society becomes much denser, it becomes almost impossible to keep track of every single “good” 
deed that was done to oneself or one’s kins, and also to keep track of each and every kin that the 
initial dispenser of goodwill is related to. This makes it almost impossible to return the favour 
when the opportunity actually comes, as one may run into a number of problems, such as not 
recognizing that this is a kin of a benefactor. 
A short history of morality: Virtue-based ethics, deontology, and consequentialism 
  After human societies evolved into hierarchal complex institutions, writing was 
developed (Diamond, 2005), and since then, humans have also attempted to define what was 
right and wrong. This provides us with one of the rudimentary definitions of what morality is: A 
sense of what is right and wrong. Early leaders of human societies (e.g., kings, priests, chiefs) 
often incorporated morality with religion and law, and have tried to dictate or guide how people 
should behave or think. In many cases, the distinction between the early morality, law and 
religion were not clear (e.g., the Biblical books of Judaism, the Code of Hammurabi from the 
Babylonians).  
Early approaches to morality were essentially virtue-based (e.g., Aristotle and Lao-Tze), 
where virtues are skills of social perception and action (Churchland, 1998; McDowell, 1979). 
The aim of early moralists were not simply reducing morality to a set of rules, but rather, it aims 
to shape perceptions, emotions and intuitions holistically (MacIntyre, 1984). Therefore, the focus 
was on the practices and habits of the individual. A person does not become moral simply by 
learning and reasoning, but rather, it is acquired through a lifetime of practice and training. 





right deliberative reasoning, but it is about responding (behaviorally and cognitively) to every 
situation in life in the right way (usually in reference to God or gods).   
 However, during the Enlightenment, virtue-based ethics were criticized as being tied too 
closely with religion and God, and Enlightenment philosophers attempted to secularize ethics by 
distilling principles that were universal and did not have to depend on the authority of religious 
institutions or spiritual deities (i.e., God). Therefore, during the Enlightenment in the eighteenth 
century, virtue-based ethics soon gave way to two other approaches: deontology and 
consequentialism (Arthur, 1999; MacIntyre, 1984; Pincoffs, 1986).  
 Deontologists, like Immanuel Kant (1764/1960), focused solely on the “rightness” and 
“wrongness” of the actions itself. Therefore, morality was based on the logic of non-
contradiction: the rule that governs one’s own actions is also the same rule that governs the 
actions of others. Consequentialists, on the other hand, focused solely on the consequences of the 
actions. John Stuart Mill (1859/2002) argued that morality should be based on a simple rule: act 
in such a way that would result in the greatest total good. Consequently, the common emphases 
of deontology and consequentialism gave us yet another definition of morality: it is a set of 
abstract universal rules that guide moral decisions through rational reasoning.  
Contrary to the perspective of virtue-based ethics, the secularization movement of 
morality narrowed the focus from a broader one of identity (e.g., “Whom should I become?”), to 
a narrower one of behavior (e.g., “What is the right thing to do?”), to which Haidt and Kesebir 
(2010) termed as the “great narrowing” of morality. Philosopher Edmund Pincoffs (1986) argued 
that this led to the modern perspective that morality is a set of rules meant to guide reasoning and 






 Much of modern research on morality utilizes the same methodology: invite participants 
into the laboratory, give them a moral dilemma, and then observe or ask how participants would 
respond to these dilemmas using rule-based rational reasoning (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; 
Greene, et al., 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Koenigs et al., 2007; Marsh et al., 2011). In 
other words, researchers deliberately put participants into a quandary. This line of inquiry was 
first popularized in psychology by Lawrence Kohlberg (1969), who introduced moral dilemmas 
such as the Heinz dilemma into the developmental psychology literature. The Heinz dilemma is 
as follows (Kohlberg, 1981): 
 A woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that 
the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same 
town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was 
charging ten times what the drug cost him to produce. He paid $200 for the radium and 
charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to 
everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 
which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to 
sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug and 
I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store 
to steal the drug for his wife. 
 
Should Heinz have broken into the store to steal the drug for his wife? Why or why not? 
   
 Kohlberg (1969) was interested in studying qualitative changes in moral reasoning, which 
were in turn based on the stages of cognitive development that were outlined by the eminent Jean 





justice. While Kohlberg contributed greatly to the understanding of how morality can develop 
over time within an individual, not everybody concurred with his conclusions. Coral Gilligan 
(1982) argued that Kohlberg overemphasized justice and ignored reasoning that was based on 
care for others. In other words, Gilligan argued that while the ethic of justice was more important 
for men, the ethic of care was more important for women when it came to moral reasoning.  
 While Gilligan’s (1982) claims have received some support (Walker, 1984), the debate 
between the relative importance of justice (or fairness) and care (or harm to others) on moral 
reasoning has come to dominate the field of moral psychology. While the debate has highlighted 
the importance of considering gender differences when it comes to moral reasoning, it has also in 
turn narrowed the perspective of morality simply to one based on conscious rational cognition of 
harm and fairness. This is clearly characterized by the influential definition by Turiel (1983, p. 
3), where he defined the moral domain as “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare 
pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.” Clearly, any rules or judgments that fall 
outside of justice, rights and welfare, are not part of morality. But is this view clearly 
representative of what morality is? 
Social Intuitionist Model 
 Recognizing the limited view of moral psychology as a legacy of both the secularization 
movement and the research paradigm started by Kohlberg, Haidt (2001, 2007; Haidt & 
Bjorklund, 2008) proposed that psychology’s view of morality needs to be broadened so as to 
account for various other findings about human decision making and behavior that have 
accumulated since then. Haidt (2007) first argued that Turiel’s (1983) definition of morality 





societies that are nearer the Gesellschaft (civil society) ideal (Tönnies, 1887/2001). However, 
morality of traditional societies that are nearer the Gemeinshaft (community) ideal would mostly 
fall outside of Turiel’s (1983) conceptualization. A alternative definition was then proposed 
(Haidt & Kesebir, 2010, p. 800): 
 Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, 
institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress 
or regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life possible. 
 With this conceptualization of morality, Haidt (2001) built on the proposal raised by 
David Hume (1777/1960), and argued that morality is not simply based on reason, but rather, is 
mostly derived from our intuitions. Therefore, he proposed the social intuitionist model (SIM), 
by which he outlined the mechanisms of how moral judgments are made (Haidt, 2001). An 
important aspect to note is that Haidt’s conceptualization does not pit “cognition” with 
“emotion” or “affect”. Rather, it proposes that moral intuitions are automatic processes of 
evaluation and is defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of 
consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the character or actions of 
a person, without and conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing 
evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 188). This is contrasted with 
moral reasoning, which are “conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given 
information about people (and situations) in order to reach a moral judgment” (Haidt, 2001, p. 
818). Therefore, the contrast is similar to those used by dual process theories prevalent in social 
psychology now (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989), with moral intuitions running on 
“system 1” (or “heuristic processing”), and moral reasoning running on “system 2” (or “systemic 





and welfare, and also went beyond simply explaining morality through rational reasoning, 
providing a much broader sense of what morality may encompass.  
Critique of existing methodology 
 As briefly reviewed earlier, one of dominant methodology in investigating morality is the 
usage of quandaries (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, et al., 2001; Haidt, et al., 1993; Hauser, 
2006; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981; Marsh, et al., 2011; Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & 
Saxe, 2010). However, putting participants in quandaries, and getting them to solve them, may 
not be necessarily reflective of real life moral situations. Quandaries intentionally put 
participants into forced-choice situations in which they are to choose between two pre-selected 
options. For example, in the trolley dilemma used by several investigators (e.g., Greene, et al., 
2001; Koenigs, et al., 2007; Marsh, et al., 2011), participants given the following scenario:  
A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. 
The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of 
tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Will you to turn the trolley in order to save 
five people at the expense of one?  
Essentially, participants are forced to choose between killing one person and killing five 
people. In the Heinz dilemma by Kohlberg (1969), participants were asked whether Heinz should 
steal the drug or not. Therefore, quandaries artificially restricted the choices a participant could 
have in the first place, by limiting what their next action or outcome should be. However, 
morality in real life is more than simply choosing between two choices. The actual number of 
choices for an individual can potentially be indefinite. In the case of Heinz, should Heinz steal 
the drug or not? Or should he beat up the druggist until the druggist relented instead? Or should 





the drug anymore? Or should Heinz simply ask around to see if there are other druggists that 
may have similar but probably less effective and cheaper drugs? More pertinently, most 
quandaries revolve around the themes of justice, rights and welfare. Therefore, it seems pertinent 
to explore using other methods to see if current conclusions drawn from the use of quandaries 
can be generalized. 
 In summary, morality so far has been conceptualized in several ways. From a 
rudimentary definition of a guide as to what is “right” or “wrong”, to a guide as to who we 
should become, to a set of abstract rules that guides our behavior, and now to subconscious 
processes that help us intuit and guide our cognition and behavior. Morality, it seems, has 
changed its form significantly over the ages. One of the predominant methodologies currently 
used to investigate morality is the use of quandaries. However, this approach seems to reduce 
morality to making forced-choices in specific scenarios. Therefore, it is unclear whether findings 







Overview of Research 
 In the two brief reviews of freedom and morality, it was revealed that there were at least 
two “great narrowings” that occurred. The first was the “great narrowing” of a multi-faceted and 
complex concept of freedom to become simply freedom of choice (Markus & Schwartz, 2010), 
while the second was a “great narrowing” of morality from one that focuses on identity to one 
that primarily deals with behavior (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).  
The “great narrowing” of freedom is based on the important observation that current 
dominant conceptualizations of freedom has gradually moved away from systemic freedom (i.e., 
Berlin’s positive and negative freedoms) and come to mean only freedom of choice (Markus & 
Schwartz, 2010). It was highlighted earlier that one commonality of the conceptualizations of 
freedom is the importance of the human will and autonomy, and that is also the common thread 
that linked various philosophers’ views of freedom to the various conceptualizations of freedom 
in the current literature of psychology (i.e., reactance theory and self-determination theory). 
Consequently, Alford (2005) has also provided some evidence that the dominant 
conceptualization of freedom is indeed the freedom of choice, albeit limited to the younger 
population (i.e., age 18-30 years). Moreover, he also showed that their conceptualizations of 
freedom are dichotomous. Hence, a preliminary conclusion is that freedom has come to mean 
freedom to choose, and younger individuals tend to perceive that they either are free, or they are 
not. Simply put, freedom is having a choice and being able to exercise personal agency, while a 
lack of freedom means having no choice, and not being to exercise personal agency. 





There has been a preponderance of research on choice, and a recent study by Leotti and 
Delgado (2011) has provided some neurological evidence that choice itself may be inherently 
rewarding. In the study, participants reported liking cues that predicted a future opportunity to 
make a choice more than cues that predicted no choice. Moreover, the anticipation of choice 
itself was associated with increased activity in corticostriatal regions, particularly the ventral 
striatum, which are involved in affective and motivational processes (Leotti & Delgado, 2011). 
Furthermore, even when the choice itself confers no additional benefits, both humans and 
animals have been shown to prefer having a choice to not having a choice (Bown, Read, & 
Summers, 2003; Suzuki, 1997, 1999). 
More than just inherently rewarding and desirable in itself, choice may be fundamentally 
adaptive for our survival. Since individuals exercise control over the environment by making a 
variety of different choices, making choices is assumed to reinforce the perception of personal 
control, and a removal of choice would likely undermine this belief (Leotti, Iyengar, & Ochsner, 
2010). Consequently, perceiving and exercising control is considered to be highly adaptive, and 
the presence or absence of perceived personal control can potentially have an impact on the 
regulatory functions of cognition, emotion, and even physical health (Bandura, Caprara, 
Barbaranelli, Gerbino, & Pastorelli, 2003; Ryan & Deci, 2006; Shapiro, Schwartz, & Astin, 
1996). Hence, choice can plausibly be conceived as the vehicle for perceiving control (Leotti et 
al., 2010). 
While there is evidence for the indirect benefits of choice, there is also evidence 
demonstrating the direct benefits of choice. A meta-analysis on 41 studies showed that providing 
choice results in enhanced intrinsic motivation, effort, task performance, and perceived 





illustrate the beneficial effects of choice on intrinsic motivation, Zuckerman et al. (1978) found 
that participants who were given a choice to work on three of the six puzzles provided, 
subsequently spent more time engaged in the puzzle-solving task in a free-play period as 
compared to participants who were assigned three of the six puzzles to work on.  
Lepper and colleagues have also shown the positive effects of choice on subsequent 
learning and task performance. In the study by Iyengar and Lepper (1999), Caucasian American 
students performed best on tasks that they have personally chosen as compared to tasks that they 
were assigned to. Similarly, Cordova and Lepper (1996) showed that the provision of choice 
resulted in a greater number of problems solved in a math test among children, even when the 
choices appear trivial.  
 While the effects of choice seemed to be relatively positive, some studies have instead 
shown that choice had little or even a negative effect instead (e.g., Reeve, Nix, & Hamm, 2003). 
Flowerday and colleagues have demonstrated in a series of studies that the provision of choice 
does not always lead to positive effects (Flowerday & Schraw, 2003; Flowerday, Schraw, & 
Stevens, 2004). Specifically, Flowerday and Schraw (2003) showed that students who were 
given a choice between two tasks: a crossword puzzle and an essay task, did not exhibit greater 
task performance or engagement. Moreover, students who were given a choice actually exhibited 
lower effort as compared to the students who were not given a choice. More surprisingly, 
Flowerday et al. (2004) actually showed that no-choice participants actually produced higher 
quality essays as compared to students who were given a choice. All these effects have led to 
some researchers proposing that it is possible for individuals to experience choice overload, in 
which too many options can possibly lead to negative outcomes (see Chernev, Böckenholt, & 





 In summary, while it is not the intent of this thesis to present a systematic review of the 
research on choice, it is important to note that one of the dominant methodology used by 
researchers of choice was to put participants into either the choice or no-choice conditions to 
examine the possible effects of choice. Since the perception of freedom has been narrowed down 
to typically mean freedom of choice, I utilized the same dichotomous method to explore the 
possible effects of choice. 
Moral attitudes  
In the previous review on morality, it was highlighted that a dominant way of 
investigating morality was through the use of quandaries (e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, et 
al., 2001; Haidt, et al., 1993; Hauser, 2006; Marsh, et al., 2011; Young, Camprodon, Hauser, 
Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010), which was popularized by Kohlberg (1969). While this method 
has clearly advanced our understanding of morality, it is questionable whether the use of 
quandaries encapsulates how morality functions per se. Specifically, it was argued that 
quandaries artificially narrowed down the available options, thus may not reflect actual decisions 
made by the individual. 
Another approach adopted by researchers is to examine moral attitudes (e.g., Skitka, 
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). While there exist many possible 
definitions of attitudes (e.g., Allport (1935) famously presented 16 definitions before offering a 
17th of his own), a simple and intuitive definition was provided by Eagly and Chaiken (1993). 
According to them, an attitude is “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a 
particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour” (1993, p. 1). Similarly, Petty, Wegener 





Crano and Pislin (2006) defined attitudes as “evaluative judgments that integrate and 
summarize… cognitive/affective reactions” (p. 347). 
While evaluation is at the heart of all attitudes, not all attitudes are the same. Current 
theorizing in social psychology purports that certain attitudes have more power because they are 
more extreme, important and certain than other attitudes (see Petty & Krosnick, 1995 for a 
review). Consequently, Skitka and colleagues posited that certain attitudes, which are rooted in 
moral conviction, are different from those attitudes that are not, and had different interpersonal 
consequences (Skitka, 2002; Skitka et al., 2005). For example, Skitka et al. (2005), in a series of 
studies, showed that attitudes with greater moral conviction predicted greater physical and social 
distance from, and tolerance for attitudinally dissimilar others. Similarly, Wainryb and 
colleagues found that children and adults viewed divergent attitudes about moral issues as 
undesirable and intolerable. However, divergent attitudes about other sorts of issues were 
perceived to be tolerable and, in some cases, even desirable (Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 
2001; Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998). Furthermore, in a series of studies using fMRI, Moll 
and colleagues (Moll, Eslinger, & Oliveria-Souza, 2001; Moll, Oliveria-Souza, Bramati, & 
Grafman, 2002; Moll, Oliveria-Souza, Eslinger, Bramati, Mourão-Miranda, Anderiuolo, & 
Pessoa, 2002) presented participants with stimuli with and without moral content, and found that 
judgments in response to stimuli with moral content activated different brain regions as 
compared to judgments in response to stimuli with non-moral content. Specifically, Moll et al. 
(2002) found that the moral condition led to greater activity in the left medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC), while the non-moral/social condition led to greater activity in the left lateral OFC as well 
as the left amygdala. Taken together, these different lines of research suggested that there exist 





In line with this, the social-cognitive domain theory (SCDT; Nucci, 1981; Turiel, 1983, 
1998) posits that there are cognitive structural differences between moral and non-moral 
attitudes. Specifically, it posits that people perceive the evaluative status of non-moral issues as 
dependent on domain-specific authorities (e.g., individual or social), while viewing the 
evaluative status of moral issues as unalterable and not dependent on external authority. For 
example, whether someone eats mushrooms should be up to the individual, and whether to drive 
on the right side of the road depends on the norms established by the social entity or group the 
individual is entrenched in. These norms may be rejected under the right circumstances. 
However, issues like torturing innocent children are viewed as objectively and universally 
wrong. These, unlike the former, cannot be rejected nor altered.  
Does Choice affect Morality? 
While there has been attempts to reverse the “great narrowing” of morality (i.e., Haidt, 
2001), current dominant perceptions of morality still tends to focus on other what is “right” 
behavior. However, more than simply functioning to guide what is “right” and “wrong”, Smith 
(2003) proposed that morality functions akin to a form of social bondage, in which an individual 
binds himself or herself, so that the individual does not act in certain ways. Many times, this 
form of bondage goes beyond a cost-benefit analysis, in which an individual may act in certain 
ways even if there is no obvious benefit to the individual (e.g., risking one’s life to save an 
unrelated child from drowning). If Smith (2003) is correct to point out that morality primarily 
functions to constrain, it is posited that it requires self-regulation to act in a moral way. 
If acting in a moral way requires self-regulation, and given that we make moral decisions 





there is very limited research in this area that links choice related constructs with morality related 
constructs, but there exists some evidence that choice might indeed influence morality. For 
example, Vohs and Schooler (2008) found that in the anti-free-will condition, participants who 
were exposed to a deterministic message (i.e., portraying behavior as a consequence of 
environmental and genetic behavior) exhibited higher levels of cheating on a math task as 
compared to a control group. In their second study, participants who were exposed to 
deterministic statements cheated by overpaying themselves for their performance on a cognitive 
task, while participants reading statements endorsing free-will did not. Furthermore, 
Vansteenkiste, Sierens, Soenens, Luyckx, and Lens (2009) examined the autonomous and 
controlled motivation of high school students, and found that while autonomous motivation was 
negatively correlated with both cheating attitudes and behavior, controlled motivation was 
positively correlated with both of the above.  
While the evidence seems to indicate that choice or autonomy is consistently related with 
less cheating and hence, more moral behavior, a recent study by Patall and Leach (2015) showed 
that the picture is more complex than it seems. When given a choice between two tasks, 
participants in the choice condition were less likely to cheat as a result of enhanced perceptions 
of competence as compared to the no-choice condition. On the other hand, participants in the 
choice condition also reported higher levels of perceived opportunities to cheat as compared to 
no-choice participants. Also, the work by Savani and colleagues showed that choice can 
potentially lead to less moral attitudes and behaviors. Savani, Stephens, and Markus (2011) 
showed that an activation of choice led to less support for policies that supported intergroup 
equality and societal benefits (e.g., reducing pollution), increased blaming on the victims, and 





priming a choice mind-set increases the acceptance and maintenance of wealth inequality. 
Participants primed with the concept of choice were less disturbed by existing wealth inequality, 
and less likely to support redistribution of educational resources and raising taxes on the rich. 
Taken together, the current empirical evidence paints a relatively complex picture of how choice 
and autonomy may interact with morality. 
Looking at the evidence above, this leads us to another pertinent question: assuming that 
choice and autonomy does interact with morality, how exactly does choice and autonomy affect 
moral attitude expression, and what exactly are the psychological mechanisms that underlie that 
process?  
Choice and morality: The self-determination theory perspective 
The self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985, Deci & Ryan, 2000) posits that 
there exist innate psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness that guide 
human motivation and behavior. Of importance is the construct of autonomy, which refers to the 
volition, or the desire to direct one’s experiences and behaviors so that it is accordance with 
one’s identity (Angyal, 1965; deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1980; Ryan & Connell, 1989; Sheldon & 
Elliot, 1999). SDT proposes that if the fundamental psychological need for autonomy is met, it 
would result in enhanced intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000), while if the individual is 
being controlled or has no autonomy, diminished intrinsic motivation ensues (Deci, Connell, & 
Ryan, 1989). 
Hence, SDT presents a set of hypotheses with regards to how choice and autonomy may 
interact with moral attitude expression. SDT predicts that choice would lead to higher levels of 





intrinsically motivated to act in accordance with his or her own moral beliefs. On the other hand, 
SDT predicts that individuals in the no-choice scenario would experience less autonomy, and 
hence a decrease in intrinsic motivation. Hence, individuals would be less intrinsically motivated 
act in line with their own moral beliefs. 
Present Research and Prior Limitations 
The current investigation focused on the effects of choice on expressed attitudes, 
especially in the moral domain. Since not all attitudes are equally socially desirable (Banaji & 
Heiphetz, 2010), explicit attitudes, especially moral attitudes, may be highly susceptible to social 
desirability effects. Moral attitudes held by an individual can be perceived as reflective of one’s 
moral character. Furthermore, if one expresses divergent moral attitudes from the majority, one 
risks social isolation and can potentially pay a high social cost (Skitka et al., 2005; Wainryb et 
al., 2001). Therefore, expressing moral attitudes in a socially desirable manner is highly 
important to the individual, and consequently, highly influenced by the social norms. In other 
words, most individuals would express moral attitudes that are near to the social norm.   
However, what if some individual moral beliefs were divergent from the majority? Would an 
individual be more willing to deviate from the norm if he or she experiences higher levels of 
choice and autonomy? 
SDT would predict that as individuals experience more choice and autonomy, they would 
also consequently experience higher levels intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000), and hence, 
more likely to act in accordance to one’s beliefs. Therefore, it is predicted that individuals that 
experience choice would become more willing to express non-normative beliefs, and thus, more 





levels of autonomy would subsequent experience diminished intrinsic motivation (Deci, Connell, 
& Ryan, 1989), and hence, less likely to act in accordance to one’s beliefs. Consequently, it is 
predicted that individuals in the no-choice scenarios would become less willing to express their 
non-normative beliefs, and would be less likely to deviate from the norm. Here, it is important to 
clarify that it is not argued that individuals experiencing choice are more likely to possess non-
normative beliefs. Rather, it is assumed that both groups possess some non-normative beliefs. 
However, due to pressure from social desirability, it is argued that only the group experiencing 
choice and autonomy would subsequently become more willing to express those non-normative 
beliefs. 
The present research also attempted to address several potential limitations that previous 
research contained. First, previous research tended to assign the moral or non-moral status of the 
issues investigated a priori (e.g., Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003; Turiel, 1983; Wainryb et al., 
1998, 2001). However, it is unclear whether this actually reflected the actual perspective of the 
participants. For example, Miller, Bershoff and Harwood (1990) showed that there existed clear 
cultural differences in the behaviors perceived to be obligatory by Americans and Indians. 
Hence, following a suggestion raised by Huebner, Dwyer and Hauser (2006), a moralness scale 
that ran from social-conventional to moral was used. Participants were instructed to rate each 
issue using the scale provided, thereby ensuring that potential interpersonal differences in terms 
of the moralness of each issue was accounted for. Therefore, whether each issue is considered as 
moral or non-moral is determined by the participant, and not by the experimenter. 
Second, previous research typically used a small limited number of issues (e.g., Miller et 
al., 1990; Skitka, 2005, Turiel, 1983; Wainryb et al., 1998, 2001), hence it was unclear whether 





morality in general per se. Consequently, we adapted a list of issues used by Wright, Cullum, and 
Schwab (2008) to extend the range of issues being assessed by the participants. 
Summary of Goals and Experiments 
 Summarizing, this research has several goals. Study 1 will investigate the predictions 
made by the self-determination theory on attitude divergence using a choice-no choice paradigm. 
Study 2 will aim to directly manipulate autonomy, instead of indirectly through choice to 
investigate the predictions of self-determination theory. Study 3 investigated the same 
predictions using an implicit measure to bypass social desirability. Study 4 will attempt to find 
further evidence beyond the laboratory by looking at data drawn from the World Values Survey 
across 87 societies from 1981-2009. Subsequently, implications of the findings and future 
directions will be presented. Lastly, pilot studies that were conducted to verify the validity and 









The first study examined the effects of choice on explicit attitude divergence from the 
norm. Utilizing a two-task paradigm, I tested if participants’ expressed attitude divergence, 
would be affected by a prior seemingly unrelated task involving choice.  
Method 
Participants 
 280 undergraduate participants (202 females, 78 males; mean age = 20.23, SD = 1.44) 
were recruited as part of a larger study, and were given course credits in fulfilment of course 
requirements for psychology introductory courses. They were then invited to return for a follow-
up study for extra credits. A total of 69 participants (56 females, 12 males; mean age = 19.75, SD 
= 1.05) responded and took part in the current study, and were randomly distributed into two 
conditions: choice or no-choice. 
Procedure 
 Participants were first asked to respond to an online survey on different issues (see 
Attitudes). They were then asked to return a week later to the laboratory for the follow-up study. 
Participants were then told that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies that sought to 
validate certain experimental procedures. The experimenter then briefed the participants that they 
would first participate in a study that examined the relationship between memory and choice, and 
would need to complete a memory-choice task. Upon completion of the first task, they were told 
to proceed to the second study in which they would complete the online survey for a second 
time. After the briefing, participants were then seated in separate cubicles, each with a personal 






 Attitudes. Participants were given 48 items with short descriptions (e.g., Exercise: 
People should get a certain amount of exercise), and asked to indicate their attitudes by 
responding on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disapprove, 9 = strongly approve; adapted 
from Wright et al., 2008). Also, participants were also asked to rate whether each item is a moral 
issue (i.e., issues that contain universal truths or principles that differentiate right from wrong), 
or whether it is a social-conventional issue (i.e., issues are defined as issues that are dependent 
on social norms and cultures). The definitions were provided to the participants, and they were to 
similarly rate each item on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = social-conventional, 9 = moral). Issues 
covered include items such as watching pornographic videos to children going to school (see 
Appendix A for list of items). All participants completed this questionnaire twice, each time one 
week apart (i.e., Time 1 and Time 2).  
 Choice Manipulation. Participants were told that they were participating in a task that 
examined the relationship between choice and memory. They were told to memorize the pictures 
that were shown to them (i.e., pictures of different natural sceneries or various types of items). 
Using a two alternative forced choice paradigm, participants were given a cue (lasting 1s) at the 
start of each trial to indicate that they either have a choice in deciding which target stimulus to 
memorize (↔; choice trial), or that they are assigned a target stimulus to memorize (← or →; 
no-choice trial). A blank screen then appears for a random duration (between 2.5~5s), and two 
grey rectangles would appear for 2s. Upon seeing the grey rectangles, participants were told to 
confirm either their choice or their assigned option by pressing the left or right arrow buttons 
during the confirmation phase. A fixation cross would then appear for a random duration 





memorize the picture they have chosen or were assigned. Once the pictures have been presented, 
a motor-response distractor task (lasting 2.5s) in which participants were to press the correct 
button in response to the arrow-head shown was included to prevent extensive rehearsal 
(Adcock, Thangravel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; see Figure 1 for full 
procedure).   
 Each participant was given 10 practice trials consisting of 5 choice trials and 5 assigned 
trials before commencing with the actual manipulation. The procedure differs at this point 
depending on the condition participants were randomly assigned to. Participants in the choice 
condition would then go through 30 choice trials, while participants in the no-choice condition 
would go through 30 no-choice trials.  
 Autonomy. The general version of the Basic Psychological Needs Scale (Gagné, 2003; 
see also Ilardi, Leone, Kasser, & Ryan, 1993) was completed in time 1 and time 2 as part of the 
online survey. The scale consists of 21 items measuring competence (“People I know tell me I 
am good at what I do”), relatedness (“I really like the people I interact with”) and autonomy (“I 
feel like I am free to decide for myself how to live my life”) and was rated on seven-point scales 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very true). Respective items were averaged. The autonomy subscale was of 
primary interest here, and Cronbach’s alpha for autonomy were .77 (time 1) and .76 (time 2) 
respectively. 
 Finally, after completing both tasks, participants went through a funnelled debriefing 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). No participant raised any suspicions that the two studies were 






 Autonomy. At Time 2, participants in the choice condition (M = 4.79, SD = .68) did not 
feel higher levels of autonomy than those in the no-choice condition (M = 4.59, SD = 1.01), t(67) 
= .98, p = .33, d = .23. Participants in the choice condition also did not exhibit any changes from 
Time 1 (M = 4.69, SD = .86) to Time 2 (M = 4.79, SD = .68), t(35) = .81, p = .43, d = .13. 
Similarly, there was no significant difference detected for no-choice participants from Time 1  
(M = 4.53, SD = .88) to Time 2 (M = 4.63, SD = .99), t(31) = 1.31, p = .20, d = .23. Therefore, 
results indicated that participants in the choice condition did not consciously perceive themselves 
as having more autonomy than those in the no-choice condition.  
 Attitudes. Means and standard deviations of the ratings of the 48 issues from Time 1 and 
Time 2 are presented in Table 1. In order to examine how far the attitudes deviated from the 
norm, deviation scores were computed for each of the 48 reported attitudes by taking the 
absolute of the deviation from the mean of each attitude. The scores were then averaged to form 
an overall deviation score (α = .85 for Time 1, .83 for Time 2). 
A 2 (Time) x 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that no significant main effects of 
Time, F(1, 66) = .12, p = .73, partial η2 = .002, or Condition, F(1, 66) = .04, p = .84, partial η2 = 
.001, were detected. Similarly, there was no significant interaction between Time and Condition, 
F(1, 66) = .09, p = .76, partial η2 = .001.  
Although no significant interaction or main effects were found, subsequent t-tests were 
conducted due to the hypotheses made. The analyses revealed that the overall deviation scores of 
participants in the choice condition did not change significantly from Time 1 (M = 1.32, SD = 





differences were found for participants in the no-choice condition (M = 1.34, SD = .22, M = 1.32, 
SD = .26; for Time 1 and Time 2 respectively), t(31) = .67, p = .50, d = .12. 
Moral and Social-conventional Attitudes. Using the moralness item, the issues were 
classified into either as a moral or social-conventional issue depending on the rating of each 
item. Items rated above the mid-point (i.e., 5) are considered to be moral issues, while items 
rated below the mid-point are considered to be social-conventional issues. Deviation scores were 
again calculated and averaged to form a moral deviation score and a social-conventional 
deviation score. 
For moral deviation scores, a 2 (Time) x 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that both 
the main effects of Time, F(1, 65) = 1.33, p = .25, partial η2 = .02, and Condition, F(1, 65) = .04, 
p = .84, partial η2 = .001, were not significant. Also, there was no significant interaction between 
Time and Condition, F(1, 65) = .37, p = .55, partial η2 = .006.  
Similarly, because of the hypotheses made, subsequent t-tests were conducted in spite of 
a lack of a significant interaction and main effects. The analyses revealed that the moral 
deviation scores of participants in the choice condition did not change significantly from Time 1 
(M = 1.23, SD = .28) to Time 2 (M = 1.21, SD = .36), t(34) = .35, p = .73, d = .006. Similarly, no 
significant differences was found for participants in the no-choice condition (M = 1.27, SD = .28, 
M = 1.21, SD = .28; for Time 1 and Time 2 respectively), t(31) = 1.45, p = .16, d = .25. 
A third 2 (Time) x 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effects 
of the manipulation on social-conventional deviation scores. The analyses found that both the 





= .23, partial η2 = .001, were not significant. Similarly, no significant interaction between Time 
and Condition, F(1, 65) = .09, p = .77, partial η2 = .001 was detected.  
Similarly, further t-tests were conducted due to the hypotheses made. The analyses found 
no significant differences for individuals in the choice condition across time (M = 1.33, SD = .48, 
M = 1.32, SD = .54; for Time 1 and Time 2 respectively), t(34) = .14, p = .89, d = .002. There 
were also no significant differences found for individuals in the no-choice condition from Time 1 
(M = 1.47, SD = .44) to Time 2 (M = 1.43, SD = .40), t(31) = .64, p = .52, d = .12. 
Discussion  
In the current study, participants were put in a situation in which they were given 
opportunities to exercise choice (i.e., choice condition), or were assigned an option instead (i.e., 
no-choice condition). Specifically, it was investigated if exercising choice would affect 
subsequent expression of attitudes on a diverse range of issues.  
The SDT posited that choice leads to higher autonomy, and hence higher levels of 
intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). On the other hand, if the individual is being controlled 
or has no autonomy, diminished intrinsic motivation ensues (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989). 
Therefore, it was predicted that no-choice participants would exhibit less deviation from the 
norm (i.e., lower deviation from the mean). Consequently, it was also predicted that for choice 
participants, they would exhibit greater deviation from the norm after experiencing choice (i.e., 
higher deviation from the mean). 
The current results showed that choice did not result any detectable change in the overall 





conventional, no significant results were detected. Therefore, none of the hypotheses were 
supported. 
One possibility is that expressing moral attitudes is relatively automatic and hence 
requires little effort. According to the social-intuitionist model (SIM; Haidt, 2001), moral 
judgments of right and wrong are primarily driven by moral intuitions, which are automatic 
processes of evaluation. Therefore, according to the SIM, expressing moral attitudes towards 
issues do not require much effort, but are instead subconscious and occur very quickly. 
Therefore, it is possible that expression of moral attitudes may not be affected by a conscious 
experience of choice. 
Another possibility is that the manipulation of choice was not strong enough. Although 
Leotti et al. (2010) argued that choice reinforces the perception of personal control, and thus 
autonomy, another interesting observation was that participants in the choice condition did not 
consciously report higher levels of autonomy after the manipulation as compared to participants 
in the no-choice condition. This possibly implied that the manipulation might not be strong 
enough to result in increased conscious levels of autonomy, thereby affecting the predictions 
made by the self-determination theory perspective. Therefore, it is still entirely possible that 
choice does affect explicit moral attitude expression. However, the effects may only be 
observable if another manipulation was being used. 
One last possibility was that concerns for social desirability were so strong that it 
prevented even participants in the choice condition from truly expressing their true attitudes. As 
mentioned earlier, expressing divergent moral attitudes may potentially exact a huge social cost 





suppressed their true attitudes so that they do not deviate from the norm. Therefore, in order to 








One key assumption of Study 1 was that giving choice to participants would necessarily 
lead to higher levels of autonomy. In other words, all types of choice lead to higher autonomy. 
However, there is some empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. Moller, Deci and Ryan (2006) 
posited that choices that actually promoted the autonomy of participants would produce different 
results as compared to a controlled form of choice. They suggested that past studies of ego-
depletion tend to use paradigms in which participants were given a choice, but were subtly led to 
choose a particular option. However, if participants were given an unrestricted choice, autonomy 
would be boosted. Moller et al. (2006) found evidence in support of their hypotheses. 
Participants who were given unrestricted choice demonstrated greater persistence and better 
performance on subsequent tasks, while participants who were given controlled choice suffered 
from ego-depletion.  
Similarly, Reeve et al. (2003) observed that paradigms that provided option choices, such 
as choosing between several versions of a task, did not increase interest or performance of the 
participants (e.g., Overskeid & Svartdal, 1996; Schraw, Flowerday, & Reisetter, 1998). On the 
other hand, paradigms that allowed participants to control the initiation and regulation of their 
behavior, in addition to providing option choices (e.g., Cordova & Lepper, 1996; Zuckerman et 
al., 1978), enhanced intrinsic motivation and subsequent learning. Consequently, Patall et al. 
(2008) found in their meta-analysis that the effect of choice on intrinsic motivation was stronger 
when participants were given instructionally relevant options as compared to irrelevant ones. In 
summary, the empirical evidence accrued indicate that not all choices promote autonomy. 
Consequently, effects predicted by self-determination theory would surface if the experimental 





Therefore, Study 2 attempted to investigate whether autonomy would have an effect on 
subsequent attitude expression by utilizing another method. Instead of directly exposing 
participants to a controlled choice, I manipulated autonomy motivation in the current study. The 
current study utilized the procedure used by Hodgins and colleagues (Hodgins, Brown, & 
Carver, 2007; Hodgins, Yacko, & Gottlieb, 2006) to prime autonomy motivation through a 
scrambled sentence task.  
SDT (Deci & Ryan, 2000) posits that when an individual’s basic psychological needs of 
competence, relatedness and autonomy are met, they would be motivated autonomously: 
individuals would have a tendency to choose behaviors based on their own values, goals and 
interests. There is empirical evidence that autonomous orientation is positively associated with 
self-evaluation, self-awareness, self-actualization, and ego development (Deci & Ryan, 1985), 
and interestingly, higher levels of moral reasoning and lower levels of cheating (Lonky & 
Reihman, 1990). On the other hand, if the individual’s basic psychological needs are not 
sufficiently met, they would tend to be control motivated: they have a tendency to regulate 
behavior by orienting to external controls and contingencies. Empirically, control orientation has 
been shown to be linked to lower levels of self-awareness (Deci & Ryan, 1985) and also 
regulation of social behavior through external cues (Zuckerman, Gioioso, & Tellini, 1988). 
In accordance to self-determination theory, it was posited that control motivated 
individuals would suffer a drop in intrinsic motivation, and thus, less likely to express attitudes 
that deviated from the norm. On the other hand, it was predicted that among individuals who 
were autonomously motivated, they would be more intrinsically motivated, and thus more likely 







171 undergraduates participants (123 females, 47 males, 1 undisclosed) NUS were recruited as 
part of a larger study. They were given course credits in fulfilment of course requirements for 
psychology introductory courses. Participants were then invited to participate in a follow-up 
study for extra credits, 106 of whom (80 females, 25 males, 1 undisclosed) responded and 
participated in the current study. The participants were randomly assigned into one of the 
following three conditions: autonomy oriented, control oriented or neutral oriented. 
Procedure 
Similar to Study 1, participants were first asked to respond to an online survey measuring their 
beliefs on different items, and were then asked to return a week later to the laboratory for the 
study. The only difference is that participants were told that they would be completing a task 
related to verbal intelligence first, which was a scrambled sentence task. Next, they were asked 
to complete the online survey for a second time upon completion of the first. Participants were 
seated in separate cubicles, each with a personal desktop computer.  
Measures 
Attitudes. The measure used here was identical to the one used in Study 1. All participants 
completed this online questionnaire twice, one week apart. 
Autonomy, Control and Neutral Primes. Following the procedure set out by Bargh and his 
colleagues (1996), the scrambled sentence task was used to prime autonomy, control and neutral 





Hodgins, & Ryan, 2010). Each version consisted of 30 items (15 targets and 15 fillers; see 
Appendix B), in which each item consisted of five words. Participants were instructed to form a 
grammatical four-word sentence using the five words. Instructions for the autonomy condition 
includes phrases like “many people find the task enjoyable and interesting” and that “we needed 
to obtain norms”, in order to emphasize interest without pressure. On the other hand, instructions 
for the control condition include “the measure correlates with verbal intelligence in adults”, and 
“most university students should be able to complete it” to focus on increasing the sense of 
coercion and pressure that define control motivation.  
Perceived freedom. A direct manipulation check on autonomy was not included as priming 
effects were effective only if participants remain unaware of the primes (Bargh, 1992). Instead, 
the item “Some people feel that they have completely free choice and control over their lives, 
and other people that what they do have no real effect on what happens to them.” from the World 
Values Survey (WVS, 2009) was used to assess perceived freedom. Participants were then asked 
to respond using a 10 point Likert scale (1 = None at all, 10 = A great deal), on how much 
freedom and choice they feel they have over the way their life turns out. Participants completed 
this item twice: the first as part of the online survey done prior to the experiment, and the second 
time during the experiment one week later. 
Results 
Perceived Freedom. A 2 (Time) x 3 (Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that neither 
the main effect of Condition, F(2, 101) = 1.47, p = .23, partial η2 = .028, nor Time, F(1, 101) = 
.15, p = .70, partial η2 = .002, were significant. Also, there was no significant interaction detected 





Attitudes. Means and standard deviations of the ratings of the 48 issues are presented in 
Table 2. Similar to Study 1, deviation scores were computed for each of the 48 reported attitudes, 
and then averaged to form an overall deviation score (α = .84 for Time 1, .78 for Time 2). A 2 
(Time) x 3 (Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that neither the main effects of Time, F(1, 102) 
= 3.50, p = .06, partial η2 = .033, nor Condition, F(2, 102) = .83, p = .44, partial η2 = .016 were 
significant. Similarly, there was no significant interaction between Time and Condition, F(2, 
102) = .18, p = .84, partial η2 = .003.  
Because it was specifically predicted that there would be changes to the deviation scores 
in both the autonomous and control oriented conditions, further t-tests were conducted. The 
analyses revealed that overall deviation scores of the participants in the control orientation 
condition decreased significantly from Time 1 (M = 1.25, SD = .22) to Time 2 (M = 1.20, SD = 
.24), t(35) = 2.21, p = .03, d = .41 as predicted. On the other hand, contrary to predictions, 
overall deviation scores of participants in the autonomy orientation condition did not change 
significantly from Time 1 (M = 1.17, SD = .21) to Time 2 (M = 1.15, SD = .27), t(34) = .60, p = 
.55, d = .10. Similarly, no significant differences in overall deviation scores were detected for 
neutral oriented individuals between Time 1 (M = 1.19, SD = .26) to Time 2 (M = 1.15, SD = 
.26), t(33) = .94, p = .36, d = .17. 
Moral and Social-conventional Attitudes. Using the moralness item, the issues were 
classified into either as a moral or social-conventional issue depending on the rating of each 
item. Items rated above the mid-point (i.e., 5) are considered to be moral issues, while items 
rated below the mid-point are considered to be social-conventional issues. Deviation scores are 






For moral deviation scores, a 2 (Time) x 3 (Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that the 
main effect of Time was significant, F(1, 102) = 5.27, p = .02, partial η2 = .049. However, the 
main effect of Condition, F(2, 102) = 1.49, p = .23, partial η2 = .028, was not significant. 
Furthermore, the interaction between Time and Condition was also not significant, F(2, 102) = 
.30, p = .75, partial η2 = .006. Again, further analyses were conducted due the predictions made. 
Analyses revealed there were no significant differences found for autonomy oriented individuals 
(M = 1.11, SD = .22, M = 1.08, SD = .28; for Time 1 and Time 2 respectively), t(34) = .85, p = 
.40, d = .14, control oriented individuals (M = 1.18, SD = .24, M = 1.12, SD = .25; for Time 1 
and Time 2 respectively), t(35) = 1.32, p = .20, d = .22, and neutral oriented individuals, (M = 
1.09, SD = .32, M = 1.01, SD = .28; for Time 1 and Time 2 respectively), t(33) = 1.75, p = .09, d 
= .32. 
Another 2 (Time) x 3 (Condition) mixed ANOVA was applied on the social-conventional 
deviation scores. The analyses showed that both the main effects of Time, F(1, 102) = .05, p = 
.81, partial η2 = .001, and Condition, F(2, 102) = .09, p = .92, partial η2 = .002, were not 
significant. Similarly, there was no significant interaction between Time and Condition, F(2, 
102) = .22, p = .80, partial η2 = .004.  
However, due to the specific predictions made for both control and autonomy oriented 
individuals, further t-tests were conducted. Analyses revealed that no significant differences 
were found for autonomy oriented individuals (M = 1.25, SD = .35, M = 1.27, SD = .38; for Time 
1 and Time 2 respectively), t(34) = .341, p = .74, d = .06,  neutral oriented individuals (M = 1.22, 
SD = .31, M = 1.25, SD = .44; for Time 1 and Time 2 respectively), t(33) = .45, p = .66, d = .09, 
and control oriented individuals (M = 1.28, SD = .34, M = 1.26, SD = .43; for Time 1 and Time 2 






 The current study attempted to investigate whether there was evidence that autonomy 
would affect subsequent moral attitude expression by directly manipulating autonomous 
orientation. Results of the overall deviation scores indicate that control oriented individuals 
became less willing to deviate from the norm, supporting the hypothesis made. However, 
contrary to the predictions, autonomously oriented individuals showed no significant change to 
their overall deviation scores. It is also important to note that the effects found here were 
qualified by a lack of significant time and condition interaction. Also, there were no detectable 
effects found for both moral and social-conventional deviation scores.    
 It is important to note that autonomy was directly being manipulated in the current study, 
instead of indirectly through choice (i.e., Study 1). A key assumption was that as choice 
increased or decreased, the levels of felt autonomy would similarly increase or drop. However, 
evidence from Study 1 showed that participants did not exhibit any change in conscious levels of 
autonomy after the manipulation. The results were therefore in line with the assertions made by 
Moller et al. (2006) and Reeve (2003), in which that not all choice would subsequently lead to 
higher levels of autonomy. Hence, in the current study, autonomy was directly manipulated. 
However, the manipulation still failed to conclusively produce any significant effects on explicit 
attitude expression. 
 Therefore, the results from Study 2 can be interpreted as being in support for the 
proposition that social desirability may be a crucial construct. It is interesting that while 
individuals who were autonomously oriented did not deviate further from the norm, possibly due 





the norm even less. Taken together with Study 1, it can be preliminarily concluded that using 
implicit attitude measures that are able to bypass social desirability effects are critical to 







Implicit measures have been an important part of behavioural research in the field of 
social psychology (Greenwald, Poelhman, Ulhmann, & Banaji, 2009), and recent literature have 
suggested that implicit measures should be considered as important complements to explicit 
measures, and should be integral to the research into attitudes and human behaviour (De Houwer 
& Smith, 2013; Greenwald et al., 2009). And unlike the explicit instruments such as surveys and 
self-report scales that were used in Study 1 and 2, implicit measures are less prone to undesirable 
effects such as intentional manipulation, experimenter bias and social desirability (De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009).  
In the current investigation on attitudes towards moral issues, social desirability was a 
factor that was of particular interest. Specifically, since not all attitudes are equally socially 
desirable (Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010), it was posited that presenting oneself in a socially desirable 
manner affects the attitudes being expressed. Specifically, if one’s moral attitudes are divergent 
from the norm, one may choose not to express one’s moral beliefs explicitly in fear of 
experiencing reprisals from the community one is entrenched in (e.g., Wainryb et al., 2001). 
One of the advantages of using implicit measures is that they can bypass social 
desirability. If social desirability was indeed the main reason affected expressed attitudes, then it 
followed that using an implicit measure may help in bypassing it. In other words, we expected 
that implicit attitudes, which bypass social desirability, may demonstrate the effects predicted in 
Study 1. Specifically, it was predicted that participants in the choice condition would be become 





become less willing to deviate from the norm. Hence, implicit measures of attitudes were used in 
Study 3 to explore the effects on choice on moral attitudes. 
An adapted version of the Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, 
Govorun, & Steward, 2005) was used for the current study. In the AMP, participants were told 
that they would be shown two pictures one after another, in which the first is a real-life image, 
and the second an abstract character. Their task was to evaluate the pleasantness of each abstract 
character based on their gut feelings. Payne et al. (2005) showed that participants tend to 
misattribute the affective experiences elicited by the first picture onto the second one, hence, a 
positive prime would lead to a positive evaluation of an abstract character, while a negative 
prime would lead to a negative evaluation. A recent review indicated that the AMP demonstrated 
both reliability and validity, even when directly compared to other implicit measures (Payne & 
Lundberg, 2014).   
Although there were other valid and reliable implicit measures available (e.g., Implicit 
Association Test or IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the AMP was chosen 
because of the ease of use and the flexibility that it offered. One particular advantage that the 
AMP has over other implicit measures is it offers the possibility to survey a range of attitudes in 
a single setting due to the short amount of time needed for measuring each attitude. Furthermore, 
an inherent limitation of the IAT is that it requires an attitude to be measured in relation to 
another attitude (Greenwald & Nosek, 2009). For example, in a racial Black-White IAT, racial 
attitudes of participants can be measured by comparing the associations between Black-positive 
and White-positive. In this case, if participants respond faster in the Black-positive task than the 
White-positive task, it is concluded that the participant has stronger associations between the 





on the other hand, could possibly measure a concept in isolation (e.g., attitude towards the 
youth). 
However, the AMP was not entirely suitable for use in the local context and had to be 
adapted. A fundamental premise of the AMP was that the abstract characters to be judged should 
be relatively neutral. However, AMP uses Chinese pictographs as the abstract characters to be 
judged. The current sample in the study could potentially read and understand Chinese 
pictographs, rendering them no longer neutral or abstract (see Pilot Studies). Thus, by using an 
alternate set of abstract characters, it allowed me to use the AMP on a population that is 
potentially fluent in both English and Chinese. Consequently, a colleague and I conducted two 
experiments to verify the neutrality of this new set of abstract characters, and compared it with 
the original Chinese characters used in the AMP. Results indicated that the current set of stimuli 
was much more neutral compared to the original Chinese pictographs (see Pilot Studies). 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
 85 participants (60 females, 25 males) were recruited for this study, and were given 
credits in fulfilment of introductory psychology course requirements. Participants were requested 
to come to the laboratory twice (i.e., one week apart) for the experiment. In the first session, they 
were asked to complete the Adapted Affective Misattribution Procedure (AAMP, see below) in 
order to assess their implicit attitudes on different topics. Upon completion, they were thanked 
and dismissed. One week later, participants returned to the laboratory, and were randomly 






Adapted Affective Misattribution Procedure (AAMP).  The AAMP was adapted from Payne, et 
al.’s (2005) Affective Misattribution Procedure (AMP), and was used to assess the implicit 
attitudes in several domains. Similar to the AMP, participants were seated in front of a computer 
and asked to participate in a study that looked at “how people make simple but quick 
judgments”. Participants were told that they would be shown two pictures one after another, in 
which the first is a real-life image, and the second an abstract character, followed by a mask. 
Their task was to evaluate the pleasantness of each abstract character based on their gut feelings. 
They were also briefed that the first real-life image simply served as a warning that signal for the 
second picture, and could potentially bias them towards liking or disliking the abstract character, 
so they were to “do their absolute best not to let the images influence their judgment”. 
Participants were to respond by pressing a button if they thought the abstract image was more 
pleasant than average, and to press another button if they thought that the image was less 
pleasant than average.   
The key difference between the AAMP and the AMP is that while the AMP uses a set of 
Chinese pictographs as the abstract characters to be judged, the current AAMP utilizes a set of 
characters comprising of various languages (Armenian, Hebrew, Khmer, Nepali, Sinhala, 
Tibetan, and Uyghur). These languages were selected based on two criteria: a dissimilarity to 
Chinese pictographs, as well as infrequent usage in Singapore.  
During each trial of the task, the prime image appeared in the center of the screen for 
75ms, followed by a blank screen for 125 ms, and then an abstract character for 100ms, after 
which a mask would appear. The next trial would begin as soon as the participant made a 
response. Participants were exposed to primes from 12 different issues (cheating, children 





preserving the environment, punishing children, recycling, owning dangerous weapons, and 
tattoos and piercings), with each issue consisting of 6 picture primes. Each of the primes was 
repeated randomly four times, resulting in a total of 288 trials. 113 abstract characters were 
randomly paired with each prime in a random order generated by the computer program. 
Choice manipulation. In the second session of the experiment, participants returned to the 
laboratory one week after completing the AAMP in the first session. Participants were told that 
in the second session, there would be a slight modification to each trial of the AAMP. Similar to 
Study 1, at the start of each trial, participants were given a cue (lasting 150ms) at the start of 
each trial to indicate that they either had a choice in deciding what kind of picture would appear 
later in that particular trial (↔; choice trial), or that they had no choice, and were assigned a 
target picture (← or →; no-choice trial). A screen with two grey squares then appeared, and 
participants were to respond accordingly by pressing on the assigned buttons. In the choice 
condition, participants were always given the choice cue (↔) prior to each trial of the AAMP, 
while in the no-choice condition, participants were always given no-choice cues (← or →; see 
Figure 2 for an example of a single trial).  
Participants completed a total of 288 trials again in the session, and were thanked and 
debriefed. Participants were probed and asked to give a suggestion on what they thought the 
study was about. However, none of the participants came close to guessing the objective of the 
study. 
Results 
Implicit attitudes. Following the procedures laid out by Payne et al. (2005), a proportion 





proportion scores as having more positive attitudes and lower proportion scores as having more 
negative attitudes towards the issues (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations of each 
issue). Similar to Study 1, the deviation scores were calculated by taking the absolute of the 
proportion score from the mean and averaged to form an overall implicit attitude deviation score 
(α = .75 for Time 1, .86 for Time 2).  
A 2 (Time) x 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed that both the main effects of 
Condition, F(1, 83) = 5.44, p = .02, partial η2 = .061, and Time, F(1, 83) = 70.15, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .46, were significant. Overall implicit deviation scores were higher in Time 1 (M = 
0.22, SD = .07) as compared to Time 2 (M = 0.16, SD = .07), and higher in the choice condition 
(M = 0.21, SD = .08) as compared to the no-choice condition (M = 0.18, SD = .05). However, 
there was also no significant interaction between Time and Condition, F(1, 83) = .03, p = .87, 
partial η2 = .00.  
Further t-tests were conducted. The results indicated significant differences for the choice 
condition between Time 1 (M = 0.24, SD = .09) and Time 2 (M = 0.18, SD = .09), t(83) = 4.71, p 
< .001, d = .98, and for the no-choice condition between Time 1 (M = 0.21, SD = .06) and Time 
2 (M = 0.15, SD = .05), t(83) = 8.92, p < .001, d = 1.18. However, while the results for the no-
choice condition were in support of the hypothesis made, results for the choice condition was 
not. 
Moral and Social-conventional Implicit Attitudes. According to the data collected in 
Study 1 at Time 1, six issues (i.e., cheating, children drinking alcohol, drugs, eating pets, 
preserving the environment, and recycling) were classified as moral issues, while the other six 





owning dangerous weapons, and tattoos and piercings) were classified as social-conventional 
issues (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations of moralness for each issue). The issues 
were pre-determined to be in moral issues if the moralness means were above the mid-point (i.e., 
5), and social-conventional issues if it falls below the mid-point. Similarly, deviation scores were 
calculated to form both moral (α = .59 for Time 1, .69 for Time 2) and social-conventional 
implicit deviation scores (α = .52 for Time 1, .78 for Time 2). 
For moral implicit deviation scores, a 2 (Time) x 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA revealed 
that the main effects of Time, F(1, 83) = 45.85, p < .001, partial η2 = .356, was significant, with 
moral implicit deviation scores being higher in Time 1 (M = 0.22, SD = .08) as compared to 
Time 2 (M = 0.16, SD = .07). Similarly, the main effect of Condition, F(1, 83) = 5.66, p = .02, 
partial η2 = .064, was also significant, with the moral implicit deviation scores higher in the 
choice condition (M = 0.21, SD = .08) as compared to the no-choice condition (M = 0.17, SD = 
.05). However, there was no significant interaction detected between Time and Condition, F(1, 
83) = .72, p = .40, partial η2 = .009.  
Subsequent t-tests also revealed that the moral implicit deviation scores of participants in 
the choice condition dropped significantly from Time 1 (M = .24, SD = .10) to Time 2 (M = .18, 
SD = .09), t(42) = 4.34, p < .001, d = .59. Similarly, a significant decrease was found for 
participants in the no-choice condition (M = .20, SD = .06, M = .15, SD = .05; for Time 1 and 
Time 2 respectively), t(41) = 6.39, p < .001, d = 1.03. Similarly, while the results for the no-







A third 2 (Time) x 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effects 
of the manipulation on social-conventional implicit deviation scores. The analyses found that the 
main effect of Time, F(1, 83) = 71.24, p < .001, partial η2 = .462 was significant, with social 
implicit deviation scores dropping significantly from Time 1 (M = 0.23, SD = .08) to Time 2 (M 
= 0.16, SD = .08). Similarly, the main effect of Condition, F(1, 83) = 4.35, p = .04, partial η2 = 
.05, was significant, with social implicit deviation scores higher in the choice condition (M = 
0.21, SD = .09) than the no-choice condition (M = 0.18, SD = .05). However, there was no 
significant interaction found between Time and Condition, F(1, 83) = 1.37, p = .25, partial η2 = 
.016.  
Again, subsequent t-tests were conducted and found significant decreases in the social-
conventional deviation scores for individuals in the choice condition across time (M = .24, SD = 
.10, M = .18, SD = .10; for Time 1 and Time 2 respectively), t(42) = 4.35, p < .001, d = .63, and 
for participants from the no-choice condition (M = .22, SD = .06, M = .14, SD = .05; for Time 1 
and Time 2 respectively), t(41) = 8.92, p < .001, d = 1.37. Therefore, while the results for the no-
choice condition were in support of the hypothesis made, results for the choice condition was 
not. 
Discussion 
In Study 1, social desirability was postulated to have been the culprit behind a lack of 
effects observed in explicit moral attitude expression. If that were so, then by utilizing an 
implicit measure of attitude that bypassed social desirability, it followed that the effects of choice 
predicted in Study 1 may be detected here. Results indicated that both the main effects of time 





scores. Specifically, all three implicit deviation scores dropped significantly from Time 1 to 
Time 2 for participants in both conditions. Furthermore, it was also found that all three implicit 
deviation scores were higher in the choice condition as compared to the no-choice condition, 
providing some support for the predictions made. However, the critical interaction between time 
and condition was not significant across all three implicit deviation scores. 
Firstly, it is unclear as to what might have caused the drop in implicit attitude extremity 
across the two sessions. One possible explanation is that the pattern of data is an outcome of 
technical set-up of the experiment. Specifically, it may be that a test-retest paradigm using the 
AAMP tends to lower attitude deviation from the norm. In other words, the significant 
differences were artefacts of the methods used. A review of the studies using the AMP in the last 
decade revealed that all studies used the AMP only at one time point (Payne & Lundberg, 2014). 
No mention was made to whether there exist any issues of using the AMP within a test-retest 
paradigm. Therefore, it is unclear if the AMP would produce differing responses when used 
repeatedly within the span of one week. It is important to note however, that there is currently 
insufficient evidence to conclude that the current results were due to the methods utilized. 
Secondly, while the main effect of condition was found to be significant across all three 
implicit deviation scores, this was qualified by the lack of a significant interaction between time 
and condition across all three implicit deviation scores as well. Other results also revealed an 
inconsistent pattern emerging from the data. While there was evidence that participants in the no-
choice condition became less willing to deviate from the norm in the overall, moral and social-
conventional deviations, participants in the choice condition exhibited a similar pattern. 





condition, the evidence did not support the predictions made for the choice conditions. Hence, 





Study 4  
In Study 4, I attempted to investigate whether there was a relationship between 
consciously perceived levels of freedom and choice and attitude deviation by looking at the data 
of individuals surveyed from 87 societies from 1981-2009 (WVS, 2009). This approach had 
several advantages. First, it allowed me to investigate if differences in levels of perceived 
freedom and choice were linked to attitude deviation. Recall that in Study 1, there was no 
detectable changes in levels of consciously felt autonomy among the participants in both 
conditions. More pertinently, in Study 2, the item of interest in this study, “Some people feel that 
they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people that what they do 
have no real effect on what happens to them” from the World Values Survey (2009) was used to 
check if participants’ perceived levels of freedom and choice changed. However, the 
manipulations used did not show any detectable significant differences. This led to the 
unresolved question of whether conscious levels of perceived freedom was actually linked to 
attitude deviation.  
Second, the approach provided an opportunity to see if the possible effects detected in the 
laboratory could be similarly detected outside of it as well, allowing us to have greater 
confidence in terms of ecological validity. Third, we can now investigate the prevalence of the 
effects predicted by the self-determination theory, across different societies and time. It was 
predicted that positive relationships would be found between perceived freedom and attitude 
deviation. Specifically, a positive relationship between attitude deviation and perceived freedom 
would lend support to the self-determination theory. An increase in freedom would result in 
higher intrinsic motivation and thus, higher willingness to express one’s true attitudes and thus, 





willingness to express one’s true attitude, and thus lower attitude deviation. Hence, Study 4 
sought to elucidate some of the issues unresolved by the previous studies in a different context. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Participants in the World Values Survey were drawn from over 87 
societies from 1981 – 2009, over five waves. Wave 1 was conducted from 1981-1984; Wave 2 
from 1990-1994; Wave 3 from 1995-1998; Wave 4 from 1999-2004; Wave 5 from 2005-2009. 
Minimum samples of 1000 were drawn from the entire population of 18 years or older. No upper 
age limit was set for most countries, and some form of stratified random sampling was used to 
obtain representative national samples (see WVS, 2009 for more documentation on the sampling 
methods used for each country). The total number of participants is 257597.  
 After sampling, participants were interviewed face-to-face by professional organizations 
using uniformly structured questionnaires in a limited time frame. Phone interviews were 
permitted in some exceptional cases (e.g., the region is too remote or inaccessible).  
Measures 
Perceived Freedom. The item “Some people feel that they have completely free choice and 
control over their lives, and other people that what they do have no real effect on what happens 
to them.” from the World Values Survey (WVS, 2009) was used to assess perceived freedom. 
Participants were then asked to respond using a 10 point Likert scale (1 = None at all, 10 = A 






Attitudes. Participants were asked to respond on a 10-point Likert scale on how justified each of 
the issues are (1 = Never justifiable, 10 = Always justifiable). The list of issues include: claiming 
government benefits to which you are not entitled, avoiding a fare on public transport, cheating 
on taxes if you have a chance, someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties, 
homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and suicide. Similar to Study 1, 
deviation scores were computed for each of the reported attitudes and then averaged to form an 
overall deviation score (α = .76 for Wave 1, .72 for Wave 2, .68 for Wave 3, .81 for Wave 4, .80 
for Wave 5). One key thing to note is that deviation scores were calculated by country and wave. 
In other words, the deviation scores reflected how much the attitudes deviated from the country 
mean in a particular wave. 
Results 
 A total of 41 significant small positive correlations and 14 significant small negative 
correlations were found (Cohen, 1988), ranging from -0.18 to 0.20. On the other hand, 110 
correlations were not significant. Correlations are presented by country and by year (see Tables 
5-8).   
Multilevel modelling was then conducted. Participant scores were nested within Waves at 
level 2, and were in turn nested within Countries at level 3. All slopes and intercepts in the model 
were assumed to be random. Since it was hypothesised that perceived freedom would positively 
predict attitude deviation, a one-tailed test was used. Results revealed that perceived freedom 
significantly predicted attitude deviation, b = .094, t(92.26) = 1.69, p = .05. The analyses also 
revealed that the relationship between perceived freedom and attitude deviation did not show 





However, the relationship between perceived freedom and attitude deviation showed significant 
variance in intercepts across countries, Var(u0j) = .20, χ 2 (1) = .03, p < .001. However, the 
slopes did not vary across countries, Var(u1j) = .0004, χ 2 (1) = .0008, p = .60. Lastly, the slopes 
and intercepts significantly covaried, Cov(u0j, u1j) = .0002, χ 2 (1) = .00005, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 First, it was found that across 87 societies from 1981-2009, levels of freedom and choice 
were both positively and negatively correlated with the deviation of beliefs. This provided 
conflicting evidence for and against the self-determination theory. Second, multilevel modelling 
was utilized to test a 3 level model. Results indicate that perceived freedom significantly 
predicted attitude deviation. Moreover, at the country level, the relationship between perceived 
freedom and attitude deviation showed significant variance in intercepts across countries. 
Similarly, the slopes and intercepts positively covaried across countries, indicating that as the 
intercepts increased, the effects of perceived freedom on attitude deviation increased. Overall, 






Literature in psychology has predominantly conceptualized freedom in the context of the 
individual’s personal choice and control (Jonas et al., 2009) and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
The question that is being investigated in the series of studies presented here is: how does choice 
and autonomy interact with moral attitudes? The current research drew upon self-determination 
theory (Deci & Ryan, 2001) to predict how choice and autonomy affected subsequent moral 
attitude expression. Specifically, SDT predicts that as individuals experience more choice and 
autonomy, they would also consequently experience higher levels intrinsic motivation (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000), and hence, more likely to act in accordance to one’s beliefs. As a result, individuals 
would become more willing to express their moral beliefs and possibly deviate more from the 
norm. On the other hand, individuals who experience no-choice or low levels of autonomy would 
subsequently experience diminished intrinsic motivation (Deci, Connell, & Ryan, 1989), and 
hence, become less willing to act in accordance to one’s beliefs, thus also less likely to deviate 
from the norm. 
Study 1 manipulated freedom by either giving participants choice or no-choice for a 
seemingly unrelated memory task before asking them to express their moral attitudes across a 
wide range of issues. However, no significant effects were detected. There were several possible 
interpretations to this null finding. One possibility was that expressing moral attitudes was 
relatively automatic process, and hence might not be affected by conscious choice. According to 
the social-intuitionist model (SIM; Haidt, 2001), moral judgments of right and wrong are 
primarily driven by moral intuitions, which are automatic processes of evaluation. From the 





effort, but are instead subconscious and occur very quickly. Consequently, conscious changes in 
choice may not have any effect on moral attitude expression. 
Another possibility was that the effects of social desirability inhibited the willingness of 
the participants to deviate from the perceived norm. As pointed out earlier, not all attitudes were 
considered equally socially desirable (Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010), hence, participants may have 
chosen not to express one’s divergent moral beliefs in fear of experiencing social exclusion (e.g., 
Wainryb et al., 2001). Study 3 addressed this issue by utilizing an implicit measure of attitude 
(i.e., AAMP), that could bypass the issue of social desirability.  
 A third possibility was that the manipulation used did not result in changes in autonomy, 
hence, resulting in no detectable differences. While Study 1 utilized a common choice no-choice 
paradigm used by many researchers (see Patall, Cooper, & Robinson, 2008 for a review), the 
manipulation did not result in detectable changes in levels of autonomy experienced by the 
participants. Hence, it is entirely possible that a lack of significant effects was due primarily to 
the manipulation used.  
Study 2 was therefore conducted to directly manipulate levels of autonomy to investigate 
if changes in levels of autonomy would lead to changes in attitude deviation. I manipulated 
autonomous orientation and control orientation as opposed to choice. One assumption in Study 1 
was that changing levels of choice would lead to different levels of autonomy. However, the 
manipulation check in Study 1 indicated otherwise. Hence, Study 2 attempted to directly 
manipulate autonomy instead of indirectly through choice. Specifically, following a procedure 





2006), participants were primed using a scrambled sentence task towards adopting either an 
autonomy motivation, a control motivation or neutral motivation.  
Results of the overall deviation scores indicate that control oriented individuals became 
less willing to deviate from the norm after exposure to the manipulation, supporting the 
hypothesis made. However, contrary to the predictions, autonomously oriented individuals 
showed no significant change to their overall deviation scores. It is also important to note that the 
effects found here were qualified by a lack of significant main effects of time and condition and 
a non-significant interaction between time and condition. Again, it was postulated that the effects 
of social desirability may be so strong, that it suppressed the expression of possibly deviant 
moral attitudes. 
Since social desirability was identified as a possible crucial factor in Study 1 and 2, it was 
postulated that some effects should be detected when using implicit measures of attitudes that 
can presumably bypass social desirability. Study 3 therefore used an adapted version of the AMP 
(i.e., AAMP), and found that both the main effects of time and condition were significant for 
overall, moral and social-conventional implicit deviation scores, with all three implicit deviation 
scores dropping significantly from Time 1 to Time 2 for participants in both conditions. All three 
implicit deviation scores were also found to be significantly higher in the choice condition as 
compared to the no-choice condition. However, it is important to note that the critical interaction 
between time and condition was not significant across all three implicit deviation scores. 
One interpretation of the pattern of results here indicates that choice may have increased 
the willingness to deviate from the norm if attitudes were measured implicitly. This implies that 





However, this interpretation needs to be qualified, as the critical interaction between time and 
condition was not found to be significant.  
Study 4 then explored to see if there is a relationship between perceived freedom and 
attitude deviation outside the context of a laboratory, by looking at the World Values Survey. 
Participants were drawn from over 87 societies from the period of 1981 – 2009, resulting in a 
total of 257597 participants. Correlational analyses revealed that 41 small positive correlations 
and 14 small negative correlations between perceived freedom and choice, and deviation of 
beliefs were significant. Crucially, multilevel modelling revealed that perceived freedom 
positively predicted attitude deviation. Also, analyses also yielded the observations that there 
were significant differences between countries in terms of the relationship between perceived 
freedom and attitude deviation.   
 Taken together, Studies 1-4 produce conflicting evidence in support of the self-
determination theory perspective. While there is some evidence that social desirability may have 
suppressed the effect of choice and autonomy on attitude deviation, it is concluded that further 
investigation is needed to verify the findings produced here. 
Future Directions 
There are several critical improvements that can be made to the current paradigms used 
here to further verify the predictions from SDT. In Study 1, the choice-no choice paradigm 
resulted in no significant changes to the levels of autonomy experienced by the individual. 
According to Patall et al. (2008), one possibility is that participants view the choices given to 





future efforts can consider using different types of choices (e.g., instructionally relevant versus 
irrelevant, unrestricted versus forced choice) to explore their effects on attitude deviation. 
A second plausible avenue of investigation lies more in the nature of test-retest effects of 
implicit measures such as the AMP. In Study 2, it was unclear why both choice and no-choice 
conditions exhibited less attitudinal deviation over time. One crucial factor to rule out was that 
the phenomenon was not due to a test-retest effect of the AMP. Implicit measures are an 
important contribution to understanding attitudes (Greenwald, Poelhman, Ulhmann, & Banaji, 
2009),  and the AMP is currently considered to be one of the most promising measures available 
for measuring implicit attitudes (Gawronski & Ye, 2014). Hence, it is crucial that further efforts 
are focused on elucidating the effects of using the AMP in a repeated manner across time. 
Thirdly, results of Study 4 indicate that the relationship of perceived freedom and attitude 
deviation differs significantly across countries. However, it is unclear as to what is causing these 
differences. Future efforts can possibly examine other country level predictors such as current 
political climate to investigate if these are crucial moderators to the relationship. If these 
moderators are found, it would suggest that country level predictors are important contextual 
variables to be considered even when examining individual constructs when it comes to effects 
of perceived freedom. 
Lastly, freedom is a complex and multi-faceted construct (Hegel, 1817/1971) that 
plausibly can be operationalized in a multitude of ways. For example, a recent series of studies 
by Hunt (2013) approached freedom from an embodied perspective, and manipulated freedom by 
physically restricting participants by anchoring the participants’ dominant arm onto an armchair 





both the perspectives of choice and autonomy. Therefore, it is pertinent to explore other ways to 
operationalize freedom to examine of other operationalizations may result in differing outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
The current series of studies focused on conceptualizing freedom as freedom of choice and 
autonomy, and explored their effects on the expression of moral attitudes, specifically on 
attitudinal deviation from the norm. Based on the self-determination theory, it was predicted that 
choice and autonomy would lead to higher attitudinal deviation from the norm, while a lack of 
choice and lower autonomy would lead to lower levels of attitudinal deviation instead. While 
there is some evidence from the studies that choice and autonomy did have an effect on attitude 
deviation, the evidence is not completely conclusive. Taken together, the present evidence 
suggests that there is some evidence that the self-determination theory is at work when choice 
and autonomy interacts with moral attitudes. However, following repeated calls on the 
importance of replication (e.g., Roediger, 2012; Simon, 2014), it is therefore suggested that 







Affect Misattribution in an Asian Context: Adapting the AMP for Chinese-speaking 
Populations2 
Lee, L.N., & Lau, X.H.J. 
The development of implicit measures has been an important part of behavioural research 
in the field of social psychology (Greenwald, Poelhman, Ulhmann, & Banaji, 2009). Implicit 
measures can be defined as procedures in which the outcome(s) are largely influenced or 
determined by attitudes that function in an automatic manner (De Houwer & Smith, 2013). 
Unlike explicit instruments such as surveys and self-report scales, implicit measures attempt to 
study human behaviour and attitudes through means which are less prone to often undesirable 
effects such as intentional manipulation, experimenter bias and social desirability (De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009).  
One of the most extensively utilised and studied implicit measures is the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT). First presented by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998), the IAT’s 
popularity largely stems from its psychometric qualities which – unlike many contemporaries – 
have been found to be adequate and relatively consistent (Gawronski & Ye, 2014). A typical IAT 
has participants assess stimuli from one of four categories with instructions for participants to 
categorise each stimuli by pressing one of two keys. Each key is assigned to two of the four 
categories. As a measure of implicit mental associations, the IAT posits that the categorisation 
performance of the participant should be an inference to which categories are more implicitly 
associated in the individual’s memory (De Houwer et al., 2009). For instance, participants who 





positive task could be said to possess a stronger association between Black individuals and 
concepts of positivity, as compared to White individuals and positivity (De Houwer et al., 2009; 
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
While the validity of the IAT has been favourably established and well-reviewed 
(Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 
2007), the measure is not without its flaws. One oft cited limitation of the IAT is that it requires a 
comparison of at least two attitudes in relation to each other (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Hence, 
the design of the IAT precludes researchers from assigning absolute values for effect scores, 
making it difficult for researchers to quantify what a particular score on the IAT actually means 
(Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; De Houwer et al., 2009). Therefore, driven by both the limitations of 
the IAT and the emerging significance of implicit measures, research into viable alternatives has 
continued in earnest (Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). 
The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) 
One such alternative is the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), which was first 
proposed by Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart (2005). The AMP is a sequential affective 
priming task (Gawronski & Yet, 2014; Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhadt, Dierksmeier, & Banse, 2011) 
inspired by an earlier study by Murphy and Zajonc (1993). In that study, Murphy and Zajonc 
presented participants with a positively or negatively primed stimulus, followed by an 
ambiguous target object (a Chinese pictograph). After which, participants were directed to rate 
their liking for the target object on a 10-point Likert scale. The results suggested that participants 
tended to transfer their affective responses to the primed stimuli onto the target objects, but only 





Zajonc, 1993). This misattribution effect, as it is known, has been defined as the mistaking of an 
effect from a source for the effect of another (Payne et al., 2005). Furthermore, this effect occurs 
automatically with little awareness on the part of the individual (Blaison et al., 2012; Gawronski 
& Ye, 2014; Payne et al., 2005).  
 A typical trial of the AMP briefly presents participants with a pleasant or unpleasant 
priming image that is quickly followed by a neutral target object (a Chinese pictograph; refer to 
Figure 3 for examples). Shortly after, the pictograph is replaced by a black-and-white masking 
pattern. Participants are then instructed to indicate whether they feel that the pictograph was 
more visually pleasing or visually unpleasing than average, whereupon the next trial begins 
(Payne et al., 2005). Typical results from the AMP have shown that the pictographs tend to be 
rated more pleasantly when participants were exposed to a positively valenced stimuli 
beforehand and vice versa (Payne et al., 2005; Payne, Hall, Cameron, & Bishara, 2010). More 
significantly, the priming effects of the AMP remain potent even when explicit instructions were 
provided to participants on how the priming images may influence their judgment towards the 
pictographs (Payne et al., 2005; Payne, Hall, Cameron, & Bishara, 2010), despite research 
suggesting that individuals would attempt to reverse the biases when made aware of the 
possibility (Wegener & Petty, 1997; Wilson & Brekke, 1994).     
Psychometric Properties and Advantages of the AMP  
As a measure of implicit attitudes, the AMP shows promising psychometric qualities. 
Payne et al. (2005) reported an average internal consistency value of .88 using Cronbach’s α. 
Other researchers have reported similar estimates ranging from .70 to .90 (Blaison et al., 2012; 





effect sizes (Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010). Construct validity of the AMP has also been 
supported by studies that demonstrate its ability to predict judgments and behaviour in areas such 
as addictive behaviour (Payne, McClernon, & Dobbins, 2007), moral choices (Hofmann & 
Baumert, 2010) and sexual preferences (Imhoff et al., 2011). 
One key advantage of the AMP is the ease of application. The AMP can be completed by 
a participant in a single session, in as little as 5 minutes, without the need for specialised 
equipment other than a personal computer (Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010). Additionally, 
the AMP can be conducted with a set of simple visual instructions that does not require the use 
of deception. This is in stark contrast with many of its contemporaries, most of which are 
expensive and require special expertise on the part of the experimenter in order to produce 
meaningful effects (Payne et al., 2005). When directly compared to the IAT, the AMP is able to 
utilise more than two categories in one sitting if the researcher so desires, and yet is able to 
function as intended (Imhoff et al., 2011). 
Present Research 
The aim of the present research is to overcome a major limitation found in the AMP: the 
unsuitability of the measure for use in populations with a Chinese-speaking majority. As 
mentioned earlier, the AMP’s core mechanisms function on the requirement that the participant 
be presented with a neutral target object (the Chinese pictograph) in order for affect 
misattribution to take place (Blaison et al., 2012; Payne et al, 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 2003). 
Hence, a participant who can derive meaning from the Chinese pictographs would likely be able 
to differentiate an affective reaction to the pictograph from a reaction to the priming image. As 





therefore, misattribution will not occur (Oikawa et al., 2011). This concern is highlighted by the 
fact that Payne et al. (2005) excluded data from Chinese-speaking participants in their analyses, 
and that most AMP studies have been conducted using predominantly European populations 
(Blaison et al., 2012; De Houwer & Smith, 2013; Oikawa et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2005; Payne 
et al., 2010). With the population of China estimated at an approximate 1.37 billion (World 
Bank, 2013) and the emergence of Chinese as a popular language worldwide, there is a need to 
develop an alternate set of stimuli suitable for Chinese-speaking participants. This need is 
especially relevant in light of the AMP’s ability to measure implicit attitudes which may be 
controversial within Chinese-speaking societies (e.g., homosexuality, Imhoff et al., 2011), and 
therefore susceptible to the influence of social desirability. 
To this aim, two experiments were conducted. The goal of Pilot Study 1 was to show that 
the Chinese pictographs used in a typical presentation of the AMP (Payne et al., 2005; Payne et 
al., 2010) would be unsuitable for Chinese-speaking participants. In addition, Pilot Study 1 also 
sought to propose and shortlist a set of pictographs from alternative languages for use as a 
possible substitute. The purpose of Pilot Study 2 was then to closely replicate a typical AMP 
(Payne et al., 2005) using the set of alternative pictographs instead of the original Chinese 
pictographs in order to investigate the potential viability of this AMP adaptation. 
Pilot Study 1 
The intent of this experiment was to show that the AMP’s Chinese pictographs connote 
certain meanings for Chinese-speaking individuals, and would therefore elicit affective responses 
when evaluated. It was expected that the Chinese pictographs would – on average – yield more 





pictographs from alternative languages that held no meaning for these same individuals would 
result in a set of significantly more neutral responses. 
Method 
Participants. 32 undergraduate psychology students from James Cook University 
Singapore participated as part of a course requirement. Participant age and gender were not 
recorded. All participants possessed at least a rudimentary understanding of the Chinese 
language. 
Design and Materials. The experiment was a repeated measures design consisting of 
two sessions separated by at least two days in between sessions to mitigate any potential practice 
effects or fatigue. Two sets of computerised tasks were developed. Each task consisted of trials 
which contained a pictograph and multiple choice options for participants to rate the pictograph 
as either pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant. The trials were presented individually and in sequence. 
Participants could not skip trials or revisit previous trials to change their answers. The Chinese 
Language set utilised the 200 Chinese pictographs used by Payne et al. (2005) for the original 
presentation of the AMP. The Alternative Language set consisted of 235 pictographs acquired 
from various Asian languages (Armenian, Hebrew, Khmer, Nepali, Sinhala, Tibetan, and 
Uyghur). These languages were selected based on two criteria: a dissimilarity to Chinese 
pictographs, as well as infrequent usage in Singapore (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010). 
In addition, the Alternative Language set required participants to declare if they possessed any 
understanding of the aforementioned languages. Participants who indicated that they did were 





The trials in each set were counterbalanced to mitigate any potential order effects. Upon 
signing up for the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to complete either the 
Chinese or Alternative Language set for their first session and the other task set for their second 
session.  
Procedure. Participants were seated in front of a computer and directed to read the 
instructions provided on-screen. Participants were told that they would be presented with a 
pictograph on each trial of the task, and that their job was to judge whether each pictograph 
elicited a pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant response. A similar procedure was used for the second 
session, after which a full debriefing of the study was conducted. 
Results 
The proportions of responses for each task set are presented in Table 9. For each 
language sets, chi-square tests were conducted to compare the total frequency of pleasant 
responses to neutral responses, as well as unpleasant responses. Analysis of the responses for the 
Chinese language set revealed that the differences between pleasant, neutral and unpleasant 
responses were significant, X2 (2, N = 6400) = 778.66, p < .001. Analysis of the responses for the 
Alternate language set revealed that the differences between pleasant, neutral and unpleasant 
responses was also significant, X2 (2, N = 7423) = 985.72, p < .001.  
Further planned comparisons via chi-square goodness-of-fit tests revealed that for the 
Chinese language set, pleasant responses (.43) did not differ from neutral responses (.40), X2 (1, 
N = 5316) = 3.58, p = .06. However, neutral responses (.40) were significantly higher than 
unpleasant responses (.17), X2 (1, N = 3637) = 616.67, p < .001. For the Alternate Language set, 





(.22), X2 (1, N = 5331) = 832.76, p < .001. It was also revealed that neutral responses were also 
significantly larger than unpleasant responses (.28), X2 (1, N = 5811) = 455.54, p < .001. 
Discussion 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the whether Payne et al.’s (2005) original 
pictographs would continue produce relatively neutral responses for Chinese-speaking 
individuals. At the same time, it was tested if the Alternate Language set would produce a 
relatively more neutral responses. Results indicate that the Alternate Language set produced 
more neutral responses as compared pleasant and unpleasant responses, while the original 
Chinese set produced equal number of pleasant and neutral responses.   
These results suggest that with the inability to derive meaning from the pictographs, 
participants were more likely to evaluate each trial in a neutral manner. As this satisfies Payne et 
al.’s (2005) guideline criteria that potential target objects needed to provide the participant with 
as little evaluative information as possible in order for the misattribution process to work, the 
next step was to attempt a replication of the AMP using a selection of pictographs derived from 
this Alternate Language set. 
Pilot Study 2 
In Pilot Study 1, we established that the original stimuli used by Payne et al. (2005) 
generated relatively more positive responses than negative responses. However, in comparison, 
the new Alternate Language stimuli elicited relatively more neutral responses. The aim of Pilot 
Study 2 was to investigate the potential of an adapted AMP using pictographs from the Alternate 
Language set instead of the original Chinese pictographs. We eliminated stimuli which exhibited 





negative primes by using the remainder of the Alternate Language set. It was predicted that 
positive primes would elicit a positive evaluation of the pictographs, while negative primes 
would elicit a negative evaluation of the pictographs.  
Method 
Participants. The participants were 40 undergraduate psychology students from James 
Cook University Singapore who participated as part of a course requirement. Participant age and 
gender were not recorded. 
Design and Materials. The experiment was designed to closely replicate Payne et al.’s 
(2005) original presentation of the AMP using the Inquisit 4 software. Each trial consisted of a 
priming image, a pictograph, and a masking image in the form of a black-and-white “static” 
pattern. The task utilised a set of 113 pictographs selected from Study 1’s Alternate Language set 
(refer to Appendix C for a full list of the pictographs used). Each pictograph was shortlisted on 
the criteria that at least 50% of the accrued responses were neutral evaluations in Experiment 1.  
Following the procedure in Payne et al. (2005), 48 priming images (24 pleasant, 24 
unpleasant) were obtained from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995).  
Procedure. Participants were seated in front of a computer, and was directed to follow 
the on-screen instructions. Participants were informed that each trial would consist of a pair of 
images flashed in sequence, the first being a picture, and the second one a symbol. Participants 
were told that the purpose of the picture was to simply warn them of the upcoming symbol, and 
that they should do nothing about the picture. Instead, participants were informed that their task 





labelled “pleasant” if they felt that the symbol was more visually pleasing than average, and a 
key labelled “unpleasant” if they felt that the symbol was less visually pleasing than average. 
Similar to the warning condition in Payne et al. (2005), participants were told that the pictures 
could occasionally bias judgments of the symbols and were instructed to do their best at giving 
an honest assessment of the symbols. To minimise possible confusion, participants were also 
informed that a black-and-white static pattern would be displayed after each set of images until 
they input a response, whereupon the next trial would begin immediately. Participants were 
provided with 10 practice trials to familiarise themselves with the procedure. Practice trials were 
identical to the actual trials with the exception that the data was not recorded. 
Following the procedure laid out by Payne et al. (2005), each trial of the task had the 
priming image appear in the centre of the screen for 75 ms, followed by a blank screen for 125 
ms, then the pictograph for 100 ms. As mentioned, the masking image then appeared until the 
participant made a response. Participants completed 113 randomly ordered trials in which each 
pictograph was randomly paired with an IAPS priming image by the Inquisit 4 program. None of 
the pictographs in the set were repeated.     
 Upon completion of the task, participants asked to declare if they could understand any of 
the following languages: Armenian, Hebrew, Khmer, Nepali, Sinhala, Tibetan, and Uyghur. A 
full debriefing of the study was then provided. 
Results 
Participant responses were divided into two categories. A “correct” response was 
determined when a participant provided a pleasant response to a pictograph paired with a 





unpleasantly valenced priming image. An “incorrect” response was determined as the exact 
opposite (pleasant response to unpleasantly valenced pairing and vice versa).  
Chi-square analyses were conducted to compare the frequency of correct and incorrect 
responses for the different primes. Analysis of the responses for positive primes revealed that the 
difference was significant, X2 (1, N = 2147) = 600.01, p < .001. The proportion of correct 
responses (0.76) was significantly larger than incorrect responses (0.24). Similarly, analysis of 
the responses for negative primes showed that the difference was significant, X2 (1, N = 2147) = 
292.90, p < .001, with the proportion of correct responses (0.68) significantly larger than 
incorrect responses (0.32). When the primes were collapsed into one category, a last chi-square 
analysis revealed that the overall proportion of correct responses (0.71) was significantly larger 
than the overall proportion of incorrect responses (0.29), X2 (1, N = 4520) = 822.39, p < .001. 
Discussion 
The results showed that participant responses to the pictographs seem to be influenced by 
the affectively valenced priming images, as intended, in similar fashion to a typical presentation 
of the AMP (Payne et al., 2005; Payne et al., 2010). The significant difference between responses 
for correct and incorrect evaluations supports the evidence that the AMP is capable of generating 
comparatively large priming effects (Oikawa et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2005). As expected, 
priming effects of the AMP seemed to persist despite the inclusion of the warning condition, 
reaffirming the automatic and highly potent nature of the AMP’s mechanisms (Gawronski & Ye, 





More importantly for the aims of the present research, the results of this experiment 
support the robustness of the measure in generating meaningful effects despite modifications, so 
long as the criteria governing the selection of target objects is maintained. 
General Discussion 
The current research has sought to evaluate the suitability of the AMP in its original form 
for Chinese-speaking participants, as well as to explore the potential of an alternate set of stimuli 
for use with within these populations in light of the increasing importance and demand for 
psychometrically credible implicit measures (De Houwer & Smith, 2013; De Houwer et al., 
2009; Greenwald et al., 2009). Pilot Study 1 provided some evidence that using of the original 
Chinese pictographs on Chinese-speaking participants may result in a positively skewed 
response. In comparison, an alternate set consisting of pictographs from languages that 
participants did not understand was shown to be more affectively neutral, and therefore more 
suitable for use in the AMP paradigm. Pilot Study 2 then replicated a study in Payne et al.’s 
(2005) using selected pictographs from this alternate set. The results suggested that the measure 
could indeed be easily adapted for Chinese-speaking participants. 
The implications of an AMP adaptation suitable for Chinese-speaking individuals are 
many. With its well-reviewed qualities (Gawronski & Ye, 2014; Imhoff et al., 2011), the AMP is 
relevant for use over a broad spectrum of research fields. Most notably, areas of research stymied 
by a high degree of social desirability and stigma may stand to benefit from the use of the AMP. 
This could include the exploration of implicit attitudes towards controversial topics in Asian 
society such as homosexuality, religion and racism. Support for the success of research into these 





of the AMP to explore sexual preferences. Potentially, the AMP could also be utilised as a 
valuable tool for health psychologists, especially in the study of affective processes linked to 
risky behaviours such as smoking and alcohol abuse (Payne et al, 2007).  
 Future efforts should establish the validity of the measure by comparing the use of the 
alternate language set in the AMP with well-known explicit instruments on similar constructs. 
With the broad scope of application that the measure has enjoyed in the West (Hofmann & 
Baumert, 2010; Imhoff et al., 2011; Payne et al., 2007), the benefits of adapting the AMP for use 
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1 Do note that this is not a clear rebuttal against kinship selection. This does not mean kinship 
selection is not an explanation for altruistic behavior, or that kinship selection is currently not in 
operation. The point is to show that kinship selection has its limitations in explaining the current 
phenomenon that we considered as moralistic behaviors.  
As pointed out by a commentor, kinship selection is an ultimate explanation for behaviors and 
not a proximal psychological one. The reader should note that whatever proximal mechanisms 
that produces these behaviors should also make it more likely that kin would be benefitted than 
non-kin. This means simply that the effects of these mechanisms should be stronger for kin than 
non-kin, and should choose kin over non-kin. It is also not necessary that the mechanism be 
switched off for non-kin. We would expect social organisms with a lot of cognitive intra-specific 
interactions to use the same mechanisms with other members, as this helps them reap other 
rewards as well, instead of having to develop entirely new repertoire of mental mechanisms.  
Another thing to note is that the organism spends much of its time with kin than non-kin for 
various purposes. In such cases, it need not even have a proximal individual or kin-based 
differentiated action; the sheer probability of it meeting kin than non-kin assures that it would be 
helping kin more than non-kin. Hence, kinship selection still maintains a certain amount of 
explanatory power. 
2 The current set of studies were conducted at JCU by Jerrald Lau XH under the co-supervision 






Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of 48 Reported Attitudes in Study 1  
 Time 1 Time 2 
Issue M SD M SD 
Exercise 7.66 1.36 7.57 1.24 
Abortion 3.98 2.04 3.71 1.89 
Recreational drugs 2.35 1.71 2.44 1.72 
Terms of respect 7.43 1.40 7.65 1.24 
Tattoos/piercings 4.70 2.03 4.45 1.94 
Homosexual marriage 4.94 2.56 4.78 2.41 
Punishing children 5.63 1.69 5.34 1.60 
Recycling 7.58 1.25 7.35 1.37 
Cheating 2.00 1.46 2.09 1.51 
Speed limit 3.10 1.88 3.12 2.11 
Rape 1.12 0.46 1.13 0.38 
Music preferences 7.16 1.63 6.91 1.66 
Sexual promiscuity 2.54 1.79 2.74 1.89 
Owning dangerous weapons 2.77 1.76 2.88 1.52 
Preserve environment 7.69 1.31 7.62 1.19 
Preferential consideration for 
women/minorities 5.85 1.94 5.72 1.95 
Serving alcohol to underage children 2.47 1.69 2.52 1.78 
Eating pets 1.47 1.14 1.64 1.20 
Pursuing nonprofitable talents 7.20 1.44 6.97 1.53 
Honesty 7.51 1.50 7.29 1.65 
Clean living spaces 7.73 1.23 7.78 1.28 
Euthanasia 5.39 2.25 5.54 2.24 
Children playing violent video games 3.72 1.94 3.54 1.81 
Vegetarianism 3.62 1.89 3.42 1.95 
Incest 1.53 1.30 1.67 1.39 
Masturbation 4.65 2.21 3.99 2.17 
Death penalty 6.19 2.23 5.93 2.42 
Believing in God 6.59 2.01 6.71 1.91 
Political activism 6.38 1.43 6.63 1.41 
Children going to school 7.81 1.29 7.61 1.50 
Children born out of wedlock 3.90 2.00 3.74 2.01 
Children with handicaps put to death 1.55 1.34 1.57 1.42 





Reduction of consumption/pollution 7.44 1.33 7.41 1.54 
Washing of bodies 8.20 1.00 8.09 1.20 
Non-violent resolution of conflicts  7.71 1.31 7.52 1.56 
Animals in medical research 4.40 2.07 4.25 2.28 
Parents loving to children 8.44 0.87 8.23 1.19 
Pornographic videos 3.88 2.23 3.50 2.10 
Giving money to parents 7.88 1.18 7.83 1.47 
Pre-marital sex 4.07 2.37 3.35 2.15 
Claiming non-entitled benefits 2.91 1.75 2.61 1.53 
Avoiding public transport fares 2.64 1.50 2.55 1.32 
Cheating taxes 2.58 1.68 2.38 1.53 
Accepting bribes 1.97 1.37 1.57 0.88 
Prostitution 2.55 1.78 2.42 1.71 
Divorce 4.40 1.87 4.44 1.77 
Suicide 2.73 1.83 2.58 1.76 
 





Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of 48 Reported Attitudes in Study 2 
 Time 1 Time 2 
Issue M SD M SD 
Exercise 7.57 1.28 7.58 1.14 
Abortion 3.64 1.98 2.96 1.90 
Recreational drugs 2.26 1.70 2.13 1.49 
Terms of respect 7.53 1.14 7.47 1.33 
Tattoos/piercings 4.50 1.75 4.09 1.71 
Homosexual marriage 4.46 2.47 3.84 2.31 
Punishing children 5.80 1.55 5.37 1.65 
Recycling 7.56 1.28 7.40 1.24 
Cheating 1.80 1.00 1.83 0.92 
Speed limit 3.34 1.92 2.99 1.51 
Rape 1.17 0.91 1.17 0.51 
Music preferences 7.08 1.66 6.95 1.66 
Sexual promiscuity 2.25 1.83 2.01 1.46 
Owning dangerous weapons 2.73 1.64 2.95 1.67 
Preserve environment 7.67 1.16 7.52 1.23 
Preferential consideration for 
women/minorities 5.59 1.92 5.60 1.63 
Serving alcohol to underage children 2.53 1.60 2.39 1.54 
Eating pets 1.53 1.11 1.56 1.12 
Pursuing nonprofitable talents 7.13 1.33 7.01 1.42 
Honesty 7.58 1.26 7.81 1.22 
Clean living spaces 7.70 1.12 7.76 1.11 
Euthanasia 5.34 2.40 4.86 2.44 
Children playing violent video games 3.26 1.77 3.23 1.82 
Vegetarianism 3.46 1.77 3.47 1.69 
Incest 1.44 1.15 1.31 0.91 
Masturbation 4.28 2.14 3.80 1.99 
Death penalty 6.34 2.03 5.95 2.14 
Believing in God 6.85 1.80 7.08 1.65 
Political activism 6.28 1.40 6.24 1.29 
Children going to school 7.88 1.18 8.04 1.35 
Children born out of wedlock 3.46 1.97 3.03 1.76 
Children with handicaps put to death 1.39 1.02 1.31 0.79 
Daycare 5.18 1.55 5.27 1.57 
Reduction of consumption/pollution 7.57 1.15 7.56 1.16 
Washing of bodies 8.14 1.09 8.16 0.96 





Animals in medical research 4.58 1.85 4.36 1.76 
Parents loving to children 8.34 0.94 8.34 0.93 
Pornographic videos 3.39 2.02 3.07 1.89 
Giving money to parents 7.95 1.02 7.93 1.11 
Pre-marital sex 3.63 2.35 3.07 2.06 
Claiming non-entitled benefits 2.66 1.53 2.59 1.64 
Avoiding public transport fares 2.48 1.42 2.44 1.37 
Cheating taxes 2.27 1.31 2.22 1.20 
Accepting bribes 1.79 1.12 1.83 1.07 
Prostitution 2.42 1.77 1.96 1.26 
Divorce 4.12 1.84 3.95 1.87 








Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of 12 Implicit Attitudes in Study 3 
Issue M SD 
Time 1   
Cheating 0.35 0.25 
Recreational drugs 0.34 0.22 
Eating pets 0.23 0.29 
Preserve environment 0.73 0.26 
Exercise 0.77 0.28 
Homosexual marriage 0.54 0.32 
Serving alcohol to underage children 0.33 0.26 
Punishing children 0.34 0.25 
Recycling 0.73 0.29 
Children going to school 0.74 0.28 
Tattoos/piercings 0.28 0.26 
Owning dangerous weapons 0.30 0.26 
Time 2   
Cheating 0.44 0.20 
Recreational drugs 0.45 0.19 
Eating pets 0.41 0.21 
Preserve environment 0.59 0.22 
Exercise 0.58 0.22 
Homosexual marriage 0.49 0.22 
Serving alcohol to underage children 0.44 0.21 
Punishing children 0.45 0.18 
Recycling 0.56 0.20 
Children going to school 0.57 0.19 
Tattoos/piercings 0.42 0.19 





Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Moralness in Study 3 
Issue M SD 
Cheating 6.83 2.64 
Children drinking alcohol 5.15 2.83 
Children going to school 4.28 2.70 
Drugs 5.17 2.71 
Eating pets 6.13 3.29 
Exercise 3.95 2.33 
Homosexual marriage 4.69 2.75 
Preserving environment 6.14 2.41 
Punishing children 4.72 2.16 
Recycling 5.45 2.58 
Owning dangerous weapons 4.36 2.56 







Table 5. Correlations of Perceived Freedom and Attitude Deviation by Country and Year from 
1981-1991 
 Year 
Country  1981 1982 1984 1989 1990 1991 
Argentina   -.12*   .018 
Australia -.016      
Brazil      -.018 
Chile     .003  
Czech Republic     -.010  
Hungary  .03     
India     .025  
Japan .05    .003  
Mexico .02    .051*  
Nigeria     .109**  
People's Republic of 
China     -.045  
Poland    .011   
Russian Federation     .009  
Slovakia     .044  
South Africa  .055*   -.044**  
South Korea  -.005   -.064*  
Spain     -.006  
Switzerland    -.026   







Table 6. Correlations of Perceived Freedom and Attitude Deviation by Country and Year from 
1994-1999 
  Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Albania     -.183**  
Argentina  .013    .023 
Armenia    .067**   
Australia  .009     
Azerbaijan    .145**   
Bangladesh   .078**    
Belarus   .077**    
Bosnia and Herzegovina     .061*  
Brazil    .116**   
Bulgaria    .048   
Chile   .028    
Colombia     .014  
Croatia   .006    
Czech Republic     .049  
Dominican Republic   -.063    
El Salvador      -.027 
Estonia   -.081*    
Finland   .04    
Georgia   -.006    
Germany    .018   
Hungary     .094*  
India  -.054*     
Japan  .022     
Latvia   .061*    
Lithuania    .047   
Macedonia     -.136**  
Mexico   .048*    
Moldova   .085**    
New Zealand     .007  
Nigeria  -.006     
Norway   -.017    
People's Republic of 
China  -.094**     
Peru   .063*    
Philippines   .092**    
Puerto Rico  -.022     
Republic of China, 







Romania     .091**  
Russian Federation  .115**     
Serbia and Montenegro   .029    
Slovakia     .001  
Slovenia  -.029     
South Africa   -.029    
Spain  .139**     
Sweden   .007   -.05 
Switzerland   .06*    
Ukraine   .019    
United States  .038    .051 
Uruguay   .103**    
Venezuela   -.019    






Table 7. Correlations of Perceived Freedom and Attitude Deviation by Country and Year from 
2000-2004 
  Year 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Albania   -.026   
Algeria   -.087*   
Bangladesh   -.026   
Bosnia and Herzegovina  .015    
Canada -.008     
Chile -.019     
Egypt -.034     
Guatemala     -.036 
India  .007    
Indonesia  .011    
Iran -.094**     
Iraq     .019 
Japan .03     
Jordan  -.055    
Kyrgyzstan    -.046  
Macedonia  .076*    
Mexico .061*     
Moldova   .066*   
Morocco  -.072**    
New Zealand     .012 
Nigeria .02     
Pakistan  -.021    
People's Republic of 
China  -.003    
Peru  .019    
Philippines  .10**    
Puerto Rico  -.010    
Saudi Arabia    -.047  
Serbia and Montenegro  .028    
Singapore   .037   
South Africa  -.003    
South Korea  .063*    
Spain .052     
Tanzania  .002    
Uganda  -.03    
Venezuela .049     
Viet Nam  -.004    











Table 8. Correlations of Perceived Freedom and Attitude Deviation by Country and Year from 
2005-2009 
 Year 
Country  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Andorra -.060     
Argentina  .057    
Australia -.028     
Brazil  .079**    
Bulgaria  -.005    
Burkina Faso   .041   
Canada  .012    
Chile  .067*    
Colombia .008     
Cyprus  -.044    
Egypt    -.006  
Ethiopia   -.048   
Finland .062**     
France  -.041    
Georgia     .062* 
Germany  -.006    
Ghana   .028   
Great Britain .011     
Hong Kong -.036     
India  .00    
Indonesia  -.104**    
Iran   .062**   
Iraq  .003    
Italy .086**     
Japan .004     
Jordan   .017   
Malaysia  .04    
Mali   .202**   
Mexico -.033     
Moldova  .070*    
Morocco   .089**   
Netherlands  .021    
Norway   .003   
People's Republic of 
China   -.065**   
Poland .051     
Republic of China, 





Romania .044     
Russian Federation  .105**    
Rwanda   .055*   
Serbia  -.038    
Slovenia -.069*     
South Africa  .002    
South Korea .056     
Spain   .003   
Sweden  -.006    
Switzerland   .03   
Thailand   .051*   
Trinidad and Tobago  -.018    
Turkey   .056*   
Ukraine  .135**    
United States  -.029    
Uruguay  .085*    
Viet Nam  .078**    
Zambia   -.047   






Table 9: Proportion of Responses of Chinese and Alternate Languages Pictographs 
 Chinese Alternate Languages 
Pleasant 42.61% 21.72% 
Neutral 40.45% 50.10% 



























Figure 4: Example of a Single Trial in Pilot Study 2 





Appendix A: List of Issues used in Study 1 and 2 
We are interested in examining the beliefs of an individual. Please give your honest 
response to the following issues. Your response will be kept strictly confidential. 
Please look at the following issues carefully, and respond accordingly on the following scale 
(1= strongly disapprove, 9 = strongly approve). 
Exercise  
Abortion  
Recreational drugs  
Terms of respect  
Tattoos/piercings  
Homosexual marriage  
Punishing children  
Recycling  
Cheating on exams/papers  
Speed limit  
Rape  
Music preferences  
Sexual promiscuity  
Owning dangerous weapons  
Preserving and protecting the environment  
Women/minorities given preferential consideration  





Eating pets (e.g., cats/dogs)  
Pursuing nonprofitable talents  
Honesty  
Clean living spaces  
Euthanasia  




Death penalty  
Believing in God  
Political activism  
Children going to school  
Children born out of wedlock  
Children with handicaps put to death  
Children in day care  
Reduction of pollution and consumption  
Washing of bodies  
Nonviolent resolution of conflict  
Animals in medical research  






Giving money to parents as a form of filial piety 
Having premarital sex 
Claiming benefits that one is not entitled to 
Avoiding paying fares on public transport 











Appendix B: Priming Stimuli used in Study 2 
Items for priming Autonomy and Control 
Control motivation items 
1. do we to this must  
2. do I should to homework  
3. to I smile ought and  
4. for required to I’m study  
5. work to with obligated I’m  
6. meet we on deadlines must  
7. for boss coerced my me  
8. was obey we’re compelled to  
9. compulsory to attendance is our 
10. giving in to necessary is  
11. manipulates my to me boss  
12. so behavior my they restrict  
13. forced by to study I’m  
14. the by limits constrained us  
15. very are we pressured that 
 
Filler items 





2. sale for by sweatshirts are  
3. dollars salad on costs two  
4. often soda but drink I  
5. on bookmark used the she  
6. tablecloth and blue the is  
7. bright is the yes lamp  
8. is to here served lunch  
9. is the now desk wooden 
10. apple was to the delicious  
11. here the by telephone is  
12. the her to fits shoe  
13. you coffee the is hot 
14. at the new computer is  
15. he now are wears glasses 
 
Autonomy motivation items 
1. options have I two and  
2. feel are choiceful I usually  
3. is to this opportunity my  
4. I to we choose so leave  





6. in we autonomous often are  
7. have by preference a we  
8. to go and I decided  
9. to our we classes selected 
10. on choice we a have  
11. we today unconstrained were our  
12. can self-regulate to usually I  
13. actions and my are independent  
14. Now to I unrestricted am  
15. am I still for self-determined 
 
Neutral motivation items  
1. by people walk some  
2. books they be often read  
3. the shall brown was dog  
4. fence they but saw the  
5. two was had he hats  
6. plant I like obvious that  
7. was sign a there too  
8. porch the she white was  





10. the walk fish swims slowly  
11. tall is Julia quite but  
12. pictures is our good were  
13. I student am a how 
14. are pencils hers the it  






Appendix C: List of Alternate Language Pictographs  
 
